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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT R!CHMOND, 
Record No. 3615 
w·. M. BOTT, Plaintiff in Etrot, 
versus 
HAMPTON ROADS SANITATION DISTRICT COMMIS-
SION, A CORPORATION DULY CHARTERED, 
ORGANIZED AND EXISTING UNDER THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF VIItGINIA, Defendant in E~ror. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERR.OR 
.AND SUPERSEDE.AS 
To the llonorable JU,stices of the Supte1ne Court of Appeals 
of Virginia.: 
INTRODUCTORY 
The petition of W. M. Bott, herein designated as plaintiff, 
respectfully represents unto the Court that he is aggTievecl 
by a judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk 
against him rendered on the 8th day of April, in the year 1949. 
By that judgment it was held that Hampton Roads Sanitation 
District Commission, herein known as defendant; is entitled 
to collect its charges for sewage disposal emanating from 
Princess Anne Apartments, 826 West Princess Anne Road, 
.Armistead Bridge Court Apartments, 800 ·west Princess 
Anne Road, Westover Terrace Apartments, 825 Westover 
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Avenue, and Earle Court * Apartments, 3421 Granby 
2• Street, all in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, from the 
plaintiff~ W. M. Bott, as the owner of all of said apart-
ments, so long· as sucli plaintiff uses or occupies the real estate 
consisting· of said apartment buildings and the same are con-
nected with the defendant's sewage disposal system, and so 
long as sewage or industrial waste continues to enter the sew-
age disposal system of the defendant. It was further adjudged 
that the plaintiff, W. M. Bott, is not entitled to any relief in 
this cause, but that the defendant is entitled to consequential 
relief under its cross claim for the amonnt of such cbarg·es im-
posed ag·ainst the plaintiff by the defendant which have ac-
crued and become past due and payable; and for which the 
s·aid defendant was awarded a judgment against the plaintiff 
in the principal sum of Six Hundred Eighty~two and 73/100 
Dollars ($682.73), with interest thereon from the entry of said 
judgment until paid at six per cent (6%) per annum, and the-
costs in the above entitled proceeding·, to which action of the 
Court, the plaintiff then and there excepted. The transcript 
of the record is herewith presented. 
THE FACTS 
This was· a proceeding- instituted by notice of motion for a 
declaratory judgment nuder Vh·ginia Code, Sections 6140A,. 
Pt seq., to construe Chapter 65A of the Virginia Code of 1942' 
and particularly Section 1560nn thereof ancl also the provi-
sions contained in Acts of the Virginia Assembly of 1946,. 
Chapteli 206, pag·e 7 and CI1apter 65A of tlle Virginia: Code or.f' 
1942'1 particnlarly Section 1560iii7 1948 Supplement). 
*Upon tlle return of this notice of motion for deelara-
3• tory juclgmentr the defendant filed its answer a:nd cross 
claim in whicI1 it denied the aIIeg·_ation contained in the-
notice of motion for declaratory judgment that tI1e plaintiff 
had not contracted for· the as·e and servic·es of" tI1e defendant's: 
sewage disposal system and claimed that, on the contrary, the! 
plaintiff, by avai_liHg· himself of the use and services o:r the· 
defendant's sewage disposal system, had contracted for such 
use· and m1dcrtakeu to pay its· charges. It further by way of 
cross claim asked tbat the Court, as conseq.mmtial relief,. 
awar.d the defendant judgment ag-~inst tlle plaintiff for such 
charges and additional charges which might have- accrued ancI 
become past due and payable, and also denied that its action 
and undertakings had in m1y ·way deprived plaintiff of his 
})ropei~ty without due process of .law, alleging· tnat no constitu-
tfon.al question, State or Federal,. was presented in the cause~ 
. The facts leading· to the controversy in question are as fol-
lows~ The plaintiff is the· owner· in his own rig·ht of the four 
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certain apartment buildings all in the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia; the Princess Anne Apartment contains forty ( 40) in-
dividual apartment units; the Armistead Bridge Court Apart-
ment contains twenty-four (24) individual apartment units; 
the Westover Terrace A11artment contains twenty-four (~4) 
individual apartment units; and the Earle Court Apartment 
contains forty ( 40) individual apartment units, each of said 
apartment units being rented to separate tenants and none of 
said apartment units being used or occupied by the plaintiff. 
The said tenants or occupants have the sole, exclusive occu-
pancy, possession *and use of all of the said individual 
4• apartment units, and the plaintiff, even thoug·h the legal 
. owner, has no right or authority to enter in or upon or to 
use, occupy or possess the same, which are subject entirely to 
the sole, exclusive use, occupancy and possession of the re-
spective tenants therein, nor has said plaintiff contracted for 
or undertaken to pay said fees, rents or other charges in con-
nection with the said apartments for the use and services of 
the defendant's sewage disposal system. 
In view of the aforesaid state of facts, the plaintiff filed 
its notice of motion for a declaratory judgment in which it 
moved the Court to construe the provisions of the Virginia 
statutes as set out above . 
.Section 1560iii7 (1948 Supplement) referred to above reads 
in part as follows : 
"Such fees, rents and charges may be charged to and col-
lected from any person contracting for the same or fr.om the 
owner, lessee or tenant, or some or all of them, who uses or 
occupies any real estate which directly or indirectly is or has 
been connected with the sewage disposal system.'' 
The defendant, relying· upon tl1e statutory provisions re-
ferred to, and especially Section 1560iii7 supra., undertook and 
attempted to charge and collect from the plaintiff the fees, 
rents and charges imposed by it in the nature of use or serv-
ice charges which it claimed WCI'(~ anthoriz(~d by the above 
quoted statutory provision, bills for such charges covering 
the period from Aug·ust 27, 1948 to December 29, 1948, being 
as follows: 
Princess Anne Apartment 
Armistead Bridge Court .Apartment 
'-N estover Terrace Apartment 
Earle. Court Apartment 
Total 
$152.20 
86.57 
H3.67 
120.14 
$452.58 
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5* :1:Bills representing tliese charges are filed herewith as 
plaintiff's Exhibit 1, from which it will be seen that these 
bills are made out in the name of the apartment buildi:ag and 
not in the name of the plaintiff or any other person, a total 
charg·e being made for each apartment building as a whole. 
. This situation confronting· him, the plaintiff filed his notice 
of motion for a declaratory judgment, in which proceedings 
the judgment complained of was entered on April 8, 1949, and 
to which a writ of error and supersedeas are requested. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The Court el'l'e<l un<ler 'the conceded facts of this case 
in holding that the plaintiff, vV. M. Bott, as the owner of said 
apartment buildings, was using or occupying the same as con-
templated by Section 1.560iii7 (1948 Supplement). 
2. The action of the Sanitation Commission, in charging 
its sewag·c bills to the plaintiff as owner of these properties 
was contrary to the provisions of Section 1560iii7(b), and is 
therefore void. 
3. The Court erred in holding the plaintiff liable for, and 
the defendant authorized and empowered to charge and col-
lect from the plaintiff, fees, rents and other charges for tl1e 
use and services of the disposal system connected with the 
apartment buildings hereinnbove mentioned, and in holding 
that the imposition upon and collecting from said plaintiff 
said fees, rents and other charges was not violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States and of Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, 
6"' in .that it deprives 8 such owner of his property without 
due process of law. 
4. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor of the 
defendant against the plaintiff for said fees, rents and other 
charges. 
ARGUMENT. 
Assignment of Errm· No. 1. 
The Court Erred Under the Conceded Facts of This Case in 
El olding That the Plaintiff', W. M. Bott, as the Owner of 
Said .Apartment Bu-ildings, lVas Using or Occupying the 
Same as Contcniplatcd by Section 1560iii7 ( 1948 Supple-
·ment). 
It is respectfully suggested that counsel for the defendant, 
as well as the trial conrt, has fallen into error in their inter-
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})retation of the word "use" as found in the statute in ques-
tion. The defendant in its answe1· and in the oral argument 
before the Court urged that the plaintiff was using each and 
-every one of said apartment builcling·s to obtain revenues or 
profits therefrom; and the trial court, in its judgment ren-
dered on April 8, 1949, indulges in the same erroneous inter .. 
pretation by holding the plaintiff liable for the defendant's 
-charges for sewag·e disposal emanating from the four ~part-
ment buildings in question so long as such plaintiff ''uses or 
occupies the real estate consisting of said apartment build-
ings''. 
It will be seen from the foregoing that, according to the de-
fendant's and the court's interpretation, "ownership'' and 
"''use'' connote one and the same thing. This is an illog·ical 
-conclusion which is readily demonstrated by a reference to 
the pertinent language of Section 1560iii7. The fees, rents 
and charges which the defendant is authorized to collect are 
to be collected from any person contracting· for the same, 
which is not applicable in the instanl case, or "from the 
7* *owner or lessee or tenant, or some or all of them, who 
uses or occupies any real estate which directly or indi-
rectly has been connected with the sewage disposal system''. 
It will thus be seen that the person liable for such charges is 
one who "uses or occupies" said real estate. This use or 
occupancy may be either by the owner or by his lessee or 
tenant. It would be a strange distortion of language to say 
that an owner leasing premises, to which premises during the 
term of the lease he has no rig·ht of possession, is "using" 
such premises in the same sense that the actual physical oc-
-cupant thereof is using them, and yet if we follow the conten-
tion of the defendant affirmed by the trial court, we have the 
term ''use'' applied to two separate, distinct and mutually 
conflicting relationships. There can be no question but that 
the physical occupant of the premises is using the ~ame, and 
still the defendant's contention is that at the same time the 
same premises are being used by the owner who has no access 
thereto, who has parted with the use, and for a consideration 
bas transferred the same to another who thereafter is in sole 
physical possession thereof. This statute doubtless had a 
capable author and to convict him of such an illogical result, 
it would be necessa1y to totally disregard the correct applica-
tion of a word whose meaning· is well recog11ized and defined. 
It lms been generally recognized that the charges which the 
defendant is authorized to impose are upon those persons ac-
tually using and receiving the benefiti=; of the facilities in ques-
tion. Bearing· this in mind, what is the true interpretation of 
the statute f ._ It proceeds upon the natura_l _assumption that 
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the premises involved could be occupied and used by tlie 
8~ owner, in which ~vent the fees, rents *and cha1rges for the-
use and services of the sewage disposal system should be--
paid by l1im, the ow1Je.r. In the event of occupancy by a lessee· 
or tenant, these- fee's 1 r~mts and charges should be collected'. 
from said lessee or tenant. Otherwise,. if the defendant "s con-
tention is correct, tlle defendant in its arbitrary and caprici-
eus discretion, without regard to the tme- situation, couk~ 
make the collection from either the owner or tlie lessee or 
tenant, regardless· of bis relation in fact to the coofrol of and~ 
use of the facilities. Such an inequitable result, we confi-
. dently assert, walS never ccmtemplated Tuy tlm draftsrrJen of the-
statute or by the legislative body ,,rhich adopted the same~ 
It is- furt:h~r suggested tflat even had that been: irrtendecl, if. 
could hardly withstand'. the result oi judicial scrutiny. 
STA'I1UTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
As set forth a:bo~, the- sole elause in the Sanitation Aet 
which is before the Court for interpretation is found: in: Sec-
tion 1560iii7 (1948 Supplement)..: 
''Suen fees~ rents and charges may be· charged to and col--
Iected from any person carrtracting for the ~mme· or from the· 
owrier, lessee or tenant, or some· or all of them, wlH1 uses or 
occupies any real estate which directly or indire-ctiy is oir bas-. 
been connected with the sewage- disposa:1: system .. ''?' 
In tire case at har tTie Snnita:tion Commission fors· attempted'. 
to assess its clmrge·s· solely against the owner of these- fom~ 
apartment properties. Since hC' l1as not "contracted' 1 to pay· 
such charges, the Commission must obviously re·st its ca~e-
on the theory tnat ne· is the one wl10 "uses- or ot'cupies·'' the· 
real estate in question. And since ne fa certainly not '' Ofl-
eupying·' 1· the premises, tlic portion of me above-quoted Co(fo· 
Se-ction upon which tlle Commission rs relying mcey be> 
9~· *·narrowed to reac~ as- follows·: 
'' Such * ·~ ,1.: cimrges mrry T:>e cna-rge·d to m1cT coTiedccT f.ronr 
* * * the· owner, lessee or tenant • * * who uRes • * * any rean 
esta tc * ,.,.. *· connected with the sewage· disposal S).,..stem. rr 
This bring·s fnfo bold relief tlie· fact Hurt tliis cm;;e· prnsents. 
one issue and one issue only, namely, what fa tfie true· mean-
ing of tlie word "uses" as it is employed in this sectfon of 
the Sanitation .Act? J s it synonomous with "occupies' 7,. 
which connotes a physical possession and enjoyment of the 
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premises, or is it synonomous with the much broader term 
''owns''? The Commission takes the latter view-and there-
in, it is submitted, lies the error of the trial court's ruling on 
the matter. 
Counsel for the petitioner earnestly submit that the Legis-
lature, in employing the phrase '' Such charges * * ~ may be 
charged against the owner :>) * * who uses any real estate'·', 
was deliberately avoiding the imposition of charges against 
an owner of real estate mer<~ly because he "owns" that real 
estate, but was placing such liability on llim only when he 
is "using" the premises. The following arguments are ad-
vanced in support of this construction of the Act: 
1. If the Legislature had intended to hold tl1e owner liable 
for these sewage charges, it most certainly would have drawn 
the Act to read: "Such charges'" **may be charged against 
the person * • * who owns or occupies any real estate.'' Or 
the wording would have been: "Such charges may he charged 
against the owner of, or against a tenant who uses or oc-
cupies, any real estate.'' In either case, the respomdbility 
of the owner would have been established bevond all shadow 
of a doubt. Yet, instead of making·~ ownership the 
10* *basis of liability, the Legislature chose to make 'ltse 
(noun) the criterion. 
2. The following sub-paragTaph of this same Code Section 
bears out the above interpretation of the Act by re-emphasiz..: 
ing that "Such * * * charges bt~in.r, in the nature of 11,se or 
service charges, shall * * * etc." This statement can only 
mean that the charges are to be imposed upon the owner, 
lessee or tenant who is physicnlly ·using the real egtate. In 
some instances this might be the owner and the tenant jointly, 
as for example where the owner himself orcupies one unit of 
a multiple dwelling building- and the tennnt or tenants occupy' 
the remainder. 
3. The Legislature, when it first passed this Sanitation 
.A.ct, expressly made the ~cwage ch~rgc.;; a liability against 
the owner of property as such, rather thnn ag·ainst the 'lt.se1· 
of property, by making the same fl lien on tl1 n p1·ernises. See 
1938 Acts of Assembly,, Chapter_ 3B5, page ;.JlU~ which reads in 
part as follows (page 5:25) : · 
''Section 19. Lien for charges. ('a) There slmll be a lien 
upon real estate for the amount of any frcis, rents or other 
charges charged by a commission to tlw owner or les~ee or 
tenant of such real estate for the use nnd services of the 
sewage disposal system by or in conncetion with such real 
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estate. * * ,r. Such lien shall be superior to the interest of any 
owner, lessee or tenant of such real estate." 
Because of the widespread opposition which this provision 
of the Act encountered, the next session of the General As-· 
sembly omitted thi~ ohjectionablP. feature of the Act and re-
stricted the Sanitation Commh,sion to the collection of its 
charges from the '' owner, lessee or tenant or contracting 
party as set forth in Section 1560nn * * ,;.:, ", namely, from 
the owner who "uses or ocrupies the real estate''. See 1940 
Acts of Assembly, Chapter 350, page 619, which reads (page 
624): 
11 • *''Section 19. Collection of service charges. The 
commission shaJl have the rig·ht to recover tho amount 
of any fees, rents or other charges charged by the commis-
sion to the owner or lessee or tenant or contracting party, as 
set forth in Section seven of this act, for the use and services 
of the sewage disposal system by or in connection with such 
real estate and of the interest which may accrue thereon, by 
any action, suit or proceeding permitted by law or in equity." 
This section of the 1940 Act is incorporated verbatim into 
the Sanitation Aet of 1946 ( Chapter 206, par. 19), and is found 
in Sec. 1560iii19 ( Hl48 Supplement to the Virginia Code). It 
is submitted that this rcv.iew of the legislative background 
of the ·sanitation Act clearlv shows that the General As-
sembly, in view of tl1e above change, did not intend for the 
owner to be liable l'or :;.\CWage charges unless he was also one 
of the persons who actually nsed the premises-as sole or 
joint occupant. ] f this interpretation of the Act is not fol-
lowed, the owner iK still being: saddled with tho£Lc charges just 
as effectively and jm,t as inescapably as though the same were 
made a lien on his property. 
4. The argument Ret forth in the preceding parag;raph is 
lmttressed by tlle language used in Section 1560iii20 of the 
Act (1948 Supplement). The Legislature once again repeats 
its admonition that real estate as such (which is but another 
way of saying the owners of real estate) shall not be burdened 
with these c~argcf.:. That section reads in part as follows: 
"* * * no tax 8hnll be levied on real estate for such obliga-
tion' '-i. e., sewng·e charges. 
If the ownc1· mrn, aR now claimed by the CommiA~ion, be 
' charged with sewage hills merely because he is the owner of 
real estate, there cnn he 110 denying the fact that he is being 
• 
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''taxed" for such ownership, whether the liability be called 
a "t.ax" or a "sewage charge". 
12"" *5. One of the fundamental principles of statutory 
construction is that words of a statute are to be given 
their ordinary or popular meaning, unless it plainly appears 
that they were used in some other sense. (See cases collected 
in l\fichie 's Digest, Vol. ~' page 51.) Using this principle as 
.a guide, there should be no difficulty in understanding what 
the Legislature meant when it referred to an "owner * • ::. 
who uses * * * any real estate". Is he "using'' his real es-
tate when he himself is not physically possessing or enjoying 
the premises? A simple question will show that he is not-~ 
:at least so far·as the popular understanding· and employment 
of the word ''use'' is concerned. For example.] if A. owns a 
cottage at the beach and is asked: '' Are you using your 
-cottage this summer?", his answer, if l1e had rented out the 
cottage, would unhesitatingly be: "No, I'm not using it tllis 
year, I have rented it out." In other words, he would be 
distinguishing between personal use by himself and indirect 
dominion over l1is property as represented by the a(!t of rent-
ing the actual use of the same to others. 
6. The decided cases in Virginia and from other jurisdic-
tions support this distinction between the right to itse, as im-
plied by ownership, and the actual use .. as implied from physi-
cal possession or occupancy. 
See Billings v. United State.~, 232 U. S. 261. There, tJ1c 
Court was required to construe a FNleral statute which im-
posed a tax "upon the use of every forei~n built yacht 1' • ~ 
owned * * * by any citizen ~ * * of the United States.'' In 
holding that this was a tax on '' actual use'' as distinguished 
from "ownership", the Court said (page 280) : 
13• *" It is to be observed tl1at the provision deah:: with 
ownership and distinguishes between ownership and use, 
~ince it bases the tax not upon the former hut upon the latter. 
From this it follows that it is not ownership but the election 
during the taxing period of the owner to take advantage of 
one of the elements whieh are involved in ownership, the ri~bt 
to use which is tho subject upon which the statute places the 
excise duty. In this view the fact. of use, not its exfont or 
its frequency, becomes the test, as distinguished from mere 
ownership, for that in the statutory sem;c could exist without 
use having taken place. The words of the statute under this 
construction were used in an everv-dnv sense and not in a 
technical one: in other words but conve~· the distinction with-
out reference to nice analysis of the nat'ure of things which is 
commonly conceived to exist between ownership and use. Let 
• 
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it be conceded that the ownership of property includes t"De 
rig·ht to use, plainly we think, as use and owne-rship are dis-
tinguished one from the other in the pro"Vision, the ward 'use·'' 
as. there ~mployed :means 1:11ore than tl1e· mere privilege ·or 
umg which the owner enJoys,. and relates to its primary 
signification,. as defined by Virebster; 'The act of employing: 
anything o.r of applying it to one's service; the state. of being. 
so employed OT applied.' H' Ute use which arises from the· 
fact of ownership without more was what the statute pro-
posed, then ·it is inc.onceiva-ble wl1y tlie difference between use· 
and ownership. was marked in the provision and made tlie· 
basis o.f the- tax which it imposed. "\VI1ile tI1is construction: 
in tllis ca:se l~ads to tlle same conclusion as· does tbat whichi 
the CO'Urt below affixed fo the statute, tirat is,. tllat it faxed the· 
privilege of use, or, in other words the potentiality of using· 
involved in ownership, inherently there is the fundamental! 
difference between the interpretrrtiorr. we· give and that which: 
tlie Iowe:r .court adopted, since the privilege of' use is purel.,-
passive ( or subjective), a right which necessrr-ril.y pertains to1 
©wnersI1ip and must exist wT1eTC' theTe is ownership; as one· 
may not obtain o,vnersI1ip without acquiring: tlie privileges: 
ef use whicI1 owrrel'sI1ip gives. The- other, on the contrary,. 
that is, use in. tlle statutory sense, altliough it arises from 
0wnersliip; is active (objcctfve),. flurt is-, it is- me outward anc"R 
distinct exercise of a rig'l1t wllich ownersilip confe-rs hut which1 
would no.t necessarilv be exe-rtea bv me mer~ fact. of awncr-
shi pl.' ,., · ·· ·· 
1 Sm.? afso· Scnitliern· Ry: C-o~ v. Ctty of Riclinwncl~ 175 Va-. 303~ 
In tllat case- the Courf was called upon to construe. a Ccmstitn-
tionaI provision wT1icf1 gave fo municipalities the· right to im-
pose· a tax- '"for- either tTle- construction, or for tfte· use of' 
sewers.~" Under this m1tho"Vity, tI1e City of Riclimond pur-
port'ed to levy a tax "for tlie privilege- of using ~ (a)i 
14'* sewer .. r·~ Tlle- Comt,. in ·declarfng- 1J1is Crty o'l'Clinance· to, 
be nnconstitntfom:rrr said (pages 3I5,. 316)':: 
,., .Tutlge· Holt, speakfng- for tli~ comt in Quesi"nlierrv ,rr Hull~ 
159 Va. 270, 165 S. E. 382, and qrrotfng from B1aclc 011 Inter-
pretaifon of Laws·, page 25, safrI: 'It is a :,?:eneraT rule that 
the woras of a Constihltion aTe· fo oe nncierstoocT in tlle sense· 
in wI1ich they are po1ndarl.11 em.played: unless tfic ~ontext ')l"" 
the very natur<!. of tfie subject' fodieates ot11erwise:.''. 
"Webster,.s InternatfonaT Dictiomrrv givm•r ten cfofinftions: 
6f the word 'use'" as a noun. Tne first, r;rimary and popular· 
definition is 'act of employfap: anything or state of being· em-
!)loJecI; a1rnlication ;. emI?foymPnt; as, the use· ~f ff pen.; his: 
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machines are in use'. The primary definition given in the 
Standard Dictionary is 'the act of rising, employment., as of 
means or material for a purpose, application to an end, par-
ticularly a good or useful end, as use for steam and naviga-
tion'' 'Privilege of uscf' is a right to use. 'Use' is the exe·r-
cise of the privilege.'' 
'' * * * The rule of constitutional and statutorv construc-
tion, the popular meaning· of the term 'for the use· of sewers,' 
and the context of this lang·uage in tlle Conr-;titution, compel 
the conclusion that the language means 'use in fact' or 'actual 
use' as contradistinguished from 'privileg·e of using' or 'avail-
able for use'.'' 
Tl1e case which, on its facts, is submitted to be practically 
on all fours with the one at bar is McCoy v. City of Sisters-
ville CW. Va., 1938), 199 S. E. 260. In that case the City of 
Sistersville passed an or.dinance imposing- charg·es. for cer-
tain "special service'' rendered to its citizens in the way 
of 1) fire protection, 2) street lighting·, 3) sanitary sewer-
age, 4) garbage collection, and 5) street cleaning. The or-
dinance was predicated upon a state statute which gave the 
City the authority to impose such cha rg-cs "upon the users 
of such special service(r,;) ". The Court found that the or-
dinance assessed these charges ag:ainst the owners of prop-
erty, and tliat "no attempt (was) made to impose any burden 
on the users of such serviees as a cla~s, except, of course, 
as to that class of users who al'e both owners of prop-
15* erty and *users of the services.'' The Court then points 
out (page 262) : 
"The City is therefore driven to rr.Rt it~· claim on the basis 
that the charges imposed are special assessments under the 
act, and that act provides thnt [ISRes~mcnts may he impoi;,ed 
upon the users of tlie s(?rvir.es i11fonclNl to be provided for, 
and impliedly neg·atives the idea that they be imposed on 
property alone or upon a elm;:;; of peoplP owning property. 
Proceeding under the aet, the city is bound hy its terms." 
After holding· that charges for fir(\ protertion may be prop-
erly cliarged to the owners of ln1ildin9·s. on the theory tlrnt 
such owners are actuallv '' nsp1·s" of the PPrvires of the fire 
department, the Court coneludes that the owner because of 
his ownership alone, cannot' be lwlcl ]inhle for charges for 
street lighting, sanitary seweral}e. gnrha.!:l·e colfoction, or 
street cleaning·. The reusons given for thi~ distinction are as. 
follows (page 263): · · 
12 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
"There ai·e other considerations which strengthen our view 
that the ordinance as to street lig·hting cannot ... be upheld. It 
may be true that a system of street lighting confers a special 
benefit on a particular individual who happens to own real 
estate on an important highway, particularly in the business 
section of the city; yet the furnishing of street lights iR a 
governmental resp011~ibilit.y and the owner of such a build-
ing has, presumably, on account of its location and vnlue, 
paid his fair share of the expense of the entire street light-
ing system of the ci(\T, including- the section in which his prop-
erty is located. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to 
accept a theory that the owner of such building must be as-
sessed with the entire cost of lighting the street, to the ex-
clusion of a tenant who rnav have a Eltock of merchandise in 
the building equal to or in excess of the value of the building, 
and to the exclusion of those who use the street, either as 
pedestrians or by the various means of transportation used 
in carrying on traffic over the streets so lighted. ,vhat seems 
to us the inl1erent injustice of imposing such a burden on a 
particular class of individuals does not encourage us to give 
a strained construction to the statute in question. "\\Tith all 
the admitted difliculty in working out a formula under which 
the provisions of the statute may be carried out, we are un-
able to accept as sound the arguments advanced that the word 
users be given a meaning under which a special class of prop-
erty owners are laid under a burden which, in all faimess~ 
should be borne by all alike, in proportion to property 
16• valuation *under general taxation; but if this cannot be 
provided for under our levy limitation, a more equitable 
plan than that proposed should be adopted. This court can-
not set itself up ns an arbiter of what is fair. That is a leg·is-
lative function. But the Legislature having- imposed the bur-
den of tl1ese services on the users thereof, we are not dis-
posed to give its enactment a meaning not fairly to be drawn 
from the languag<~ rn;;ed, nor compatible with what we believe 
to be a just distribution of the burden of the services pro-
vided for in the net in question." 
Applying this same reasoning to the charge made by tl1e 
City against proper1y owners for sanitary sewerage services1 
the Court says ( pngc 264) : 
''What we have ~aid wit11 respect to street lighting more 
strongly applies lo f.he other services provided for, other than 
fire protection, mid it is not considered necessary to discuss 
them in detail. If the assessment for street lighting cannot 
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he sustained, the assessments for such other services cannot. 
be.,, 
'' vVe have given it ( the Act) a liberal interpretation. * * * 
However, we are unable to extend that liberality to the point 
where we can uphold a plain assessment against property, 
.and the owners of property, to the practical exclusion of every 
other class of people living in a municipality, where the act 
itself imposes the cost of the special services provided for 
upon the users thereof.'' 
7. The Sanitation Act was not adopted by the citizens of 
the Hampton Roads District until it was first submitted to a 
vote of the qualified voters of th~ Distriet. . In giving ap-
proval to the Act, the voters must lmve intended to impose 
upon themselves ns individual users and beneficiar-ies of the 
·sanitation sewerage services the responsibility to pay for 
such services. They were casting their ballots as individual 
dtizens and 11ot as owners or tenants. The West Virg·inia 
eourt in the McCov case called attention to that very sig-nifi-
<!ant consideration (page 262) : 
"Bearing upon what we may reasonably conclude the Leg-
islature had in mind in enacting this law, and the per-
17* sons *sought to be affected thereby, attention is called 
to the fact that an ordinance of this character is re-
quired to be published once a week for two successive weeks 
in two local newspapers, and if 10 per cent of the registered 
voters, by written petition, protest ag·ainst the same, it shall 
not become effective until it has been ratified by a majority 
of the votes cast by the duly qualified voters of such munici-
pality at an election duly and regularly held as provided by 
the laws and ordinances thereof. This provision, it seems 
to us, necessarily implies that the charges imposed must~ in 
theory at least, apply to all users of the services provided for, 
living within the municipality." 
Assi_qnment of Error No. 2. 
'l'he Action of the Sanitation Cmnniission, in Charging ifs 
Sewage Bills to the Plaintiff as Owner of These Proper-
ties, Was Contrary to the Provisions of Section 
1560iii7(b), and Is The1·efore TToid. 
As has been pointed out in the foregoing argument uncler 
the :first Assignment of Error, Section 1560iii7 (a) provides 
that the charges of the Sanitation Commission 
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• Hftc **may be charged to and collected from* * * the owner: ... 
lessee or tenant * * * who uses * * * any real estate * * ,;;. 
connected with the sewage disposal system.'' 
The following paragraph of the same section,: bowe-ve:r, ex-
pressly stipulates that such charges shall be. uniform for the 
same type, class and amownt of use or service of the sewa.,qc-
disposal system., The pertinent portion o.f that paragraph 
reads as follows~ 
"Sueh fees, rents and r:har,qes being in the nature of use· 
or- service chatges, shall as nearly as the Commission sl1all 
deem practicable and equitable, be uniform throug·hout the· 
district for the smne tvve, class mul amount oft use or service· 
of the sewage disposal system, and may be based or computed: 
~ither on the consumption of water, etc.', (Itlrlics, inserted.), 
It is thus sMn that the Commission is, by the very terms of 
the sta~nte.1_: required to make its charges "uniform • * * for 
the same type (and) e lass it ~ * of use or service''. If 
18* this means anything· it *certainly means that the Com-
mission must impose its charges uniformly upon all per-
sons " ( of) the same type ( and) class" who use Ute Rewage· 
disposal system. Has the Connnission followed that leg·isJa-
tive mandate by billing the plaintiff, \V. I\I. Bott, in this: 
case°l 
The answer to that question neccYssitates a brief review of' 
the method followecl by the- Commission in ass~sing its: 
charges. 
1. The individual sewage MUs involved in this· case are 
· made out in the name. of the particular apartment propert:r 
involved, for example, "·Westover Terrace Apartments, 825· 
Westover Avenue'', and are not made ouf to '\Y. ::M:. Bott or 
to· any other person, firm or corporation. (Ree plaintiff's: 
Exhibit No. I.) 
2. The plaintiff testifie(t triat tliese bills, when tendered to 
Itlm, were in this form. See record, page 19: 
"Q. I notfce tfrn:t these hilis are made out not in individunI 
names but in the name of the ,Ycstover Terrace Apartments,. 
Earle Court Apartments, Princa(.lss Anne .Apartments and 
Armistead Bridge Court Apartments f 
•. , A. That is rio·l1t. ::, 
~, Q. That is the condition in which those bills· were orig-i-
nally rendered you i· 
"A. Yes,, sir.' '' 
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3. When the Sanitation Commission first set up its books, 
and began to send ouf bills for tl1e use of the sewage system, 
it made no atte~pt whatever to determine the persons who 
were "using or occupying" any of the premises connected 
with the system but instead followed without change the ad-
dressing system used by the Norfolk City "Tater Department 
for sending out water bills. See the testimony of J. W. Mor-
ris, Jr., acting manager of the Commission, on this point 
(Record., pages 36, 37) : 
19* *"Your books are set up, then, I take it, from an 
examination of this ledger sheet: to show tl1e premises 
in question, where water is consumed; is that correcU · 
"A. Well, our records have to parallel those of the Water 
Department because-in other words, our original records 
were set up from the ,v ater Department's records and that 
is the way that heading· appears on that plate. Now, in addi-
tion to that, we found out the respom,ibility for the water bill 
was in the name of "\V. M. Bott and Company and we also had 
that record certified bv the Citv that those bills were sent to 
that- " · 
"Q. Does that appear on there anywhere, that you have a 
certification that ·w. l\f. Bott, individually, is liable for any 
water on the premises¥ 
"A. 1N e have W. lVL Bott as H notation. 
'' Q. But VV. M. Bott and Company is not "\V. M. Bott i.n-
dividua.lly? 
· '' A. ·wen, no ,sir, it is not. 
~' Mr. Ashburn: It was testified that he purchased the 
water. 
'' A. ( Continuing) This is the mailing address, Mr. Fero~ 
bee. 
"By Mr. Ferebee: 
'' Q. Mr. Morris, has your commission ever investigated to 
find out who is the legal owner of the ,v estover Terrace 
Apartments f 
'' A. No, sir. 
* * 
'* 
"Q. Ml'. M:onis, I was asking; :vou questions along this 
line: In setting up your records of the Commission, did the 
Commission make any attempt to ascertain the leg-al owner of 
any premises on which water was consumed '1 
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'' A. No, sir. 
"Q. It likewise made no such investigation as to these four 
apartments that we are concerned "about here today! 
20* *'' A. That is correct. 
'' Q. Did you make any investigation as to the persons 
actually occupying the premises f 
'' A. We did not. 
''Q. I believe you said that your records were taken ove1·, 
or, rather, copies were made from the records of the Divi--
sion of ,v ater Supply of the City of Norfolk f 
"A. That is correct." 
From this it will be seen that the Commission has never 
at any time attempted or even professed to make its charges 
conform to the type or class of use made of its facilities by 
the plaintiff or by any other person in the district. Instead, 
it has elected to disregard any and all distinction between 
types and classes of u~e, and has imposed its charges again.~t 
the property itself! Its bills are made out not to the owner 
of premises-on the theory that he may or may not be using 
the same-or to the tenant, where the actual use or occupancy 
of the premises ]ms been transferred from the owner to him-· 
but are addressed to an apartment house ( if the property has 
a name) or to a street number! 
This method of billing·, aside from being a completel_v b1incl 
operation, is contrary to the very requirement of the Sanita-
tion A.ct, which sayR that such charges ''may be charged to 
* * * any person contracting for the same or from the owner 
or lessee or tenant * * ~= who uses or occupies any real P.S-
tate. * * * '' In other words, the Commission has the duty 
to ascertain the user of its services, and to impose its charges 
upon such user. It cmmot disC'harge that duty by sending 
its bills to a street number, which is neither a "user" nor a 
legal entity. 
21 * *In addition to being violative of the Act as above 
mentioned, this method of billing flies in the very teeth 
of the restriction that charges of the Commission ''shall* * f, 
be uniform * * * for the same type (and) class of use or 
service." Granting for t.he purpose of arg·ument that the 
sending of a bill to the "·Westover Terrace Apartments" is 
the same thing as sending· it to Vv. J\L Bott, such a bill cannot 
be rendered to him merely beca:zt.c;e he havpens to be listed on 
the records of the Norfolk City Water Department as the v~r-
son to whom. Us 1uafrr bills are delivered! He mav receiv() 
those bills and then immediately turn them over to· a tenant 
for payment, in aC'rordance with th(l terms of his lease. Or 
if, as often happens, he has Rold the property in question 
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without requiring the purchaser to sign a new contract with . 
the "\Vater Department, he would turn the bill over to the 
new owner for payment. In either case, the listed addressee 
on the records of the "'\Va ter Department would not be either 
the user of the water or the one leg·ally responsible for the 
eost of the same. Yet the Sanitation Commission sends its 
bills to the same addressee as listed by the Vl ater Depart-
ment-showing unmistakably that it is imposing its charges 
not upon the same type or class of use, but upon the wholly 
fortuitous circumstance as ta the mailing addresses used by 
the Norfolk City TVater Depart1nent! 
A few examples will serve to illustrate the lack of mu-
formity which results from such a practice: ' 
1. A. owns a private home which he lives in himself. The 
water bill for the premises comes to him, as the result of a 
eontract with the "\Yater Department. The Sanitation Com-
mission MU, for sewage dispoRal, likewise comes to him 
22* -and properly so, for he is ~both ''using" and "occu-
pying'' the premises. 
2. A. owns a similar private dwelling next door, which he 
rents out to B. Under the terms of the lease, water is fur-
nished at the expense of the owner. The wa for bill and 
sewage bills both are mailed to him. He pays the water bi11, 
hut refuses to pay the sewage bill because he is neither "us-
ing" nor "occupying" the premises. 
3. A. owns a similar private dwelling which he rents out 
to C. Under the terms of the lease, water is to be paid for 
by the tenant, but the meter is left in the name· of the owner. 
The water bill and sewage bill are mailed to A., who passes 
them on to the tenant for payment. The tenant pays the 
water bill pursuant to the terms of his lease, and pays the 
sewage bill because he is ''using'' and "occupying" the prem-
ises. 
4. Same facts as in (3) above, except that the water meter 
for the house is transferred to tho name of the tenant. Water 
and sewage bilJs both go to the tenant. The tenant pays botl1 
bills. 
From these illustrations it will be seen that the Sanitation 
Commission makes no attempt wl1atever to assess its clmrg·cs 
ngainst the person who '' uses or occupies'' the premises. In 
Example No. 2, the owner is being billed for the Rewage 
charges not because he is "using'' the premises, but because 
the water ]Jill happens to be rendered to him. In example 
No. 4, although the owner stands iu exactly the same relation-
ship to the property (i. e., has rented out the exclusive use 
ts Sup:reme- Court of Appears of Virgfnfa, 
and o.ccupancy but retains the income from such rental)~ tfie, 
· Commission would bill the tena1it solely because, the water 
bill happened to be' addressed to him. 
Surely the Legislature, in adopting the Smtitation. 
23* Actr. did *not intend for-sewage charges to be borne only 
by those wnose names unfortunately happened to ap-
pear on tke mailing list of the \Vater Department! And, it 
is submitted, the "uniformity'' required in the imposition C\f 
sewage charges cannot be allowed to rest upon ru1y such ir-· 
relevant a happenstance. The Commission should no more· 
be allowed to follow this method of assessment than it should 
b.e permitted to charg·e the owner of premises on om.!' side of 
a streetr and the tenants of premises on the otT!cr side-when: 
in both inst!Snces the qu~tion of who is "'using"· or "occupy--
ing'' tlle property (as between the owners and tenants) would: 
be the same in each case. 
It is respectfully submitted tbat the principles suggestec] 
above compel a findi11g that the plaintiff in the case at bar 
bas been improperly assessed with these sewage charges_ 
Assigmne:nf of Errar Na. ff_ 
The Conrf Errctl in· If efrtin:g· tlie- Plaintiff Liable {01-, mul tlte-
Defendant .A.rtthorizerl aml E1npoweret.l to Cliarge antf 
Callecf .from fhe Plaintiff, Fees, Rents and· Other Char,qes· 
for the Use mul Sen.,fres of the Disp'Osai Sv.c;fem· Con-
necteil Willi the Avartment Bui1dings Hercfoabave 1.lfe·n-
t'ionei[, and fri H oldinrr TTurt the Impasiffon- Tl pon. atzd' 
Collecting fro·m-Safrl Plainffff Saicl Fees-, Rents and· Other 
Charges TITas Not' Violative· of tlie Fuurt'e-entJi .ffo; enrl-
ment" of the Canstttution: of {lie United States mul of Sec--
fion 1:I of (he C onsf'itntion of V irgfoia-, in; That it De-
pri1Tes Siu:li Owner of Fl is Pro;p:erfu TiVifhomt n·ue· Process-· 
@f Law~ 
, In t1le notice of motion for a declaratory judgment the dis-
. ffnct aliegatiorr is made- mat Section 1560iiT7 of the- Code of" 
Virginia as construed by tbe trial court wonlcT he repugnant to, 
the, Fourteenth Amendment of Hie Constitntiorr of me Unitecr 
States and to Section 11 of tlie Constitutio11 of Virginia! 
24* in tbat rt would dcprfrc tlle owner of *Ilis property with-
out due process of Imvr Thfa assertion is hercwitTl re;.. 
newed and relied upon as requiring a reversa I of tlie judg-· 
ment rendered by the tri~l court. As a prelimfoary to a dis-
cussion. of what we ·believe to· be tlle applicable Virginia. law'l' 
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reference will be made in passing to a few cases from other 
states evincing the judicial consensus generally upon this 
question. . 
In Waldron v. International l,Vater Company (Vt.), 112 
A. 219, 13 A. L. R. 340, it was held that a regulation of a 
water company requiring a property owner to pay for water 
furnished his tenant is unenforcible. 
In Bu,rke v. City of Water Valley, 87 Miss. 732, 40 South. 
820, 112 Am. St. Rep. 468., it was held that a regulation of. a 
water company that charges for water should be to the owner 
of the property and not to the tenant, and that if the water 
charge is not paid, the water should be cut off and not con-
nected again until the delinquent charge is paid, and which 
prevents a new tenant on tendering· water charg·es, from get·· 
ting necessary water unless he pays a delinquent charge 
against the property, is void as being unreasonable. In tho 
course of its opinion there is cited tlie following lan~uage 
with approval, "It may be desirable that a water company 
or a gas company should have an easy way of collecting its 
debts; but we see no reason why it should be enabled by tlJe 
Court to collect a debt from one who is not a party to the 
contract, when it sells its commodit~T on credit." 
Numerous additions to the nhove mig·ht be made which 
would only prove repetitious. The most ca refnl attention of 
tbe Court is now imritcd to the principles enunciated in 
25* Etheredge v. City of Norfolk .. ""148 Va. 795, which we 
believe applicable in confirming our rontention that the 
statute in question as construed by the trial court is wholly 
unconstitutional and consequently voi<l. 
The City of Norfolk was authorized by its Charter to pro-
vide an "adequate water supply for said City'' and '' to estab-
lish, impose and enforce vrnter rates''. Section 156 of the 
Norfolk City Code, 1920, reads as follows: 
"Section 156. Both o,v·ner and orcupnnt responsible for 
supply of water to premises connerted with rity sewer. 
'' The owner of any premises ·which are required by the city 
ordinances to be connected with the citv sewer shall see that 
water from the waterworks of the citv is ronnerted with said 
sewerag·e on said premises, nnd not cut off therefrom at any 
time, except for necessary repo ir~, wl1ilr. ~aid premises arc 
occupied, and such owner i;;hall cause the wnter rent for tlJe 
use of ,·vnter on said premises to 1-:c paid, the division of ,\rater_ 
supply when clue.'' 
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By a.n ordinance subsequcmt]y adopted, it was further pro-
vided as follows: 
"Whenever anv hill for service or water shall remain un-
paid thirty days" after the first of the month in which the 
same is due the bureau of water shall cut off the water from 
said premises and shall not turn the same on again until all 
delinquent charges tlrnrefor have been paid in full.'' 
Claiming its right so to do by virtue of the provisions of 
the above ordinances, the water bureau of the City pursued 
the method of charging and billing all water rents to the 
premises supplied with water inst<?ad of to the owner or oc-
cupant of the premiRes. If tbe bill so rendered.~ was not paid, 
no attempt was made to collect it from the occupant or con-
~mmer, as such, but the owner of the premises alone was held 
responsible and, upon his refusal to pay, the water would be 
shut off until the delinquent bill was paid. 
Etheredge, the plaintiff in error, bought the property 
26* in *question hi .January, 1914, and continued to own the 
same thereafter. He._ never occupied the premises; 
never consumed any water therein; never made any contract 
with the City for water to be consumed therein and never 
paid for any water so consumed. The tenant entered the 
i premises under a written lease from Etheredge in which Rhe 
covenanted to pay '' all water rents levied, 01· to be levied, 
thereon during the term.'' At the expiration of the term the 
tenant moved out leaving unpaid a bill for water consumed 
by her during lier term. Etheredge knew nothing about the 
unpaid water bill until the delinquent tenant moved out and 
when a new tenant was seeured, who, upon going to the water 
department to al'range for water, was there advised of the 
unpaid bill and told tlmt unless it waR paid water would he 
cut off. This threat was not carried into execution, but in-
Rtead an action wai:; instituted by the City ag·ainst Etheredge 
for the sum represented by the delinquent water bill in ques-
tion. 
After a detailed recital in the opinion of the pertinent facts, 
the Court proceeds : 
"Tl1e city's rig;ht to recover in this case being· based sole]~· 
upon the provisions of section 156 of the Norfolk City Code, 
the specific question presented for decision is whether that 
ordinance, insofa l' ns it seeks to make the owner of premises 
personally liable, irre~pectivc of contract, for water consumed 
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upon such owner's premises by a lessee thereof., is repugnant 
to the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States and to section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, in 
that it deprives such owner of his property without due 
process of law .. 
"The authorities are also practically unanimous that the 
l'egulation of a water company or ordinance of a munici.:. 
pality which ,requires the property owner to pay a de1iuque11t 
bill for water furnished the tenant of the premises, which 
the owner has not contracted to pay, is unreasonable and void, 
unless a lien is given on the premises by statute, or there 
27* *is at least some statutory authority therefor by ttirtm? 
of the chat·ter, or otherwise: 
'' The right of a municipal corporation or water company 
to compel a property owner to pay for water furnished to n 
former occupant seems to depend on the existence of a lien 
against the property. 27 R. C. L., page 1455. 
''Neither the charter of the city of Norfolk nor any other 
statute provides a lien on property for water rents; nor is 
there any statutory authority, so far as we are advised, for 
the ordinance in question. This being so, said ordinance, in-
sofar as it attempts to bold a property owner personally re-
sponsible for the payment of arrearages for water consumed 
by the tenant on the premises, is unreasonable and void; un-
less, as contended by counsel for the city, that provision of 
the ordinance is necessary for the protection of the public 
health, and, for that reason, a valid exercise of the police 
power of the city. 
• 
"In Bownwn v. Vir_qinia State Entomologist, 128 Vn. 351, 
105 S. E. 141, 12 A. L. R. 1121, the court quotes from 1 Lewis 
on Eminent Domain, section 249, as follows! 
" 'The Supreme Court of the United States, whieh is the 
final arbiter upon these questions, says: "Tl1e validity of 
a police regulation, whether established directly by the State 
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or by some public body acting under its sanction, must cTe-
pend upon the circumstances of each case and the character 
of the regulation, whether arbitrary or reasonable-, and, 
whether :really designed to accomplish a legitimate public-
purpose.* ~ 8 If the mean~ employed have no real substantiat 
relation to the public objects which government may legally 
accomplish, if they are arbitrary and unreasonably l1eyond. 
the necessities of the case, tl1e judiciary will disregard mere-
forms and intefere for tbe protection of rights. injuriously 
affected by such illegal action."' " 
.. 
"lt is not cl~'imed, nncl no attempt was made to show, that. 
the building belonging to Etheredge· is not connected with the-
city sewer, or that the conne·ctfons are not constructed accord-
ing to tlle building regulations. Nor is it claimed that it 
would be injurious to the public health to shut off water from 
an unoccupied building. The whole contention, then, resolves: 
itself into tllis: That it would be unl1ea:ltbful to live in 
28* a I10nse from ·which the water had been *cut off; and fo1· 
that reason the property owner should b_e required to 
pay the water rent in order to conserve tlle health of his 
tenants. vV e think it would be just as nnreasona ble as a 
police regulation to require him to do this as it would be to 
require him, irt the absence of contract, to furnish his tenant 
with any other necessity which would conduce to tlte prescr:... 
vation of' the tenant '"s health. The regulation is also 1rnrea-
sonable in its· effects, heeause it r~qnires the property owner 
-as in this case-to pay Hie delinquent water bill of a former 
tenant, which he is under no obli~ation to pay, in order to 
secure anotller tenant ancl keep l1is premi~es occupied; ancT 
denies the incoming tenant tl~ use of tlle water to whfob l1e is: 
entftled when he occupies tile premises and offers to comply·· 
with the regulations required of consumers. The language or 
the court in TY aldron v. lnternat-ional Water Gompa:nyy g5 Vt. 
135, 112 Atl. 219, 13 A. L. R. 340, is pertinent here: 
'"' 'A regulation of' a wat~r company nnauHrori"zed by sfaf-
ute, n~qui'ring a lancllord to pay for water- is unenforceable:. 
* * * Brass v. Rat'hbane-, 153 N. Y. 435, 47 N. K 90fi; 8t'ein v. 
McArrlle, 24 Ala. 344, Neither caJ1 Im be I1eid liable for a bill'. 
of a tenant. McCarflt,JJ v. llumphrey, 10'5 Iowa, 535·, 75 N. ·w~ 
314. Nor can his premises be subjected to a lien for sueh 
charges~ Turnf!t" y~ Rwvere Water Co·mpany,, 171 Mass~ 32D',, 
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50 N. E. 634, 40 L. R. A. 657, 68 Am. St. Rep. 432. * * * A rule 
that the water company will deal only with the owners of 
property occupied by tenants, if valid, would €1nlarge the ob-
ligation of the landlord to tl1c tenant to the extent of requir-
ing the former to furnish water and pay the water assessment 
in order that the premises may be occupied, and, in case the 
landlord was in arrears, would deny the tenant the right of 
water service to which he was entitled unless he paid the land-
lord's debt.' 
"Nor do we see any necessity for such a provision. It. is 
important, of course, to the :financial interests of the city that 
it should collect its water charges and derive sufficient revenue 
therefrom to maintain its waterworks; and it is true that the 
plan it has adopted, of charging such bills to the premises 
and holding the landowner respon~ible under any and all cir-
cumstances, under the penalty of making his house unin- • 
habitable by cutting off the water~ furnishes a simple and easy 
way of collecting its water rents. But, as said by the court 
in Titrner v. Revere· lvater Company, stt,pra: It may be de-
sirable that a ,vater company or a gas company shall have 
an easy way of collecting- its debts, hut we sec no reason why 
it should be enabled bv the court to· colJcd a debt from one 
who is not a party to the contract, when it sells its commodity 
on credit.' 
* * * * 
29• *'' Reading the two ordinances liereinbefore referred 
to together, it is obvious that the prov'ision of section 
156 of the Norfolk Citv Code wl1ich i8 now under considera-
tion was designed to eriforcc the collection of water rents and 
not as a health regulation. It has at the most only a remote 
connection with the public health-a connection by far too 
remote to justify us in sustaining it as a police regulation on 
that ground. \Ve therefore co1wlude tliat Raid ordinance, in-
sofar as it requires a property ow1w1·, in tlie absence of con-
tract, to pay rent due the city of Norfolk for wate.r consumed 
on the premises by the tenant, is not only unreasonable and 
unnecessary but foreign to the purpoi;e allc<1;ed, and same is 
therefore unconstitutional and void. In this ca8e it consti-
tutes an arbitrary infringement upon the rights of Mr. 
Etheredge. . 
'' 'When a health law is challemred lw the courts as un:-
constitutional on the gro1ind tl1at it ~ll'bitr;ll'ily interferes with 
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personal liberty and private property without due process 
of law, the court~ must be able to show that it has at least in 
fact some relation to the public health, and that the public 
health is the end actually aimed at., and that it is appropriate 
and adapted to that end.' In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. 
Rep. 636. 
" 'A law whic]1 assumes to be a police regulation but de-
prives the citizen of the use of his property under the pre-
tense of preserving the public health, the public safety, com~ 
fort or welfare, when it is manifest that such is not the real 
purpose of the rep;ulation, will be set aside as a chmr and 
direct invasion of the right of property without any compen-
satory damages. Cooley's ConRt. Lim. 248.' Spa-rm v. 0-itv 
of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. '\V. 513, 19 A. L. R. 1387. 
" 'The well sett led rule is that if a statute purporting to 
have been enacted to protect the public heaJtb, the public 
morals or the public ~mfety has no real substantial relation 
to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured 
by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so ad-
judge and thereby give effect to the Constitution.' H ennin.Q-
ton v. State of Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 S. Ct. 1086, 41 L. Ed. 
166.'' 
In the light of the foregoing it may ·be concluded that, in 
the absence of u statutory provision imposing n lien npon 
property for services furnished thereon to the tenant in the 
absence of a contract with the owner, the latter cannot per-
sonally be clmrgenble for the services so furnished. 
30* . *It is interesting to note that, as has previously been 
pointed out, there is no provision for such a lien in the 
pertinent legislation and., wlJen the history of the movement 
looking to the enarhnent of the Rtatutory provisions in ques-
tion is borne in mind, it will at once he concluded that the 
omission of such a provh,ion was not due to inadvertence. 
Intense public discussion followed the suggestion of the pro-
posed legislation and the main contention centered around the 
question of whether or not the enactment shou]d carry a pro-
vision for a lien on the premises in default of payment for 
services supplied thereon. This was followed by a referen-
dum in which the question was clearly defined, the result of 
which was an overwhelming majority in favor of the elimina-
tion of a lien provision. It would thus follow that, in the 
absence of such a lien~ which according to the authorities is 
a prerequisite to the collection from the owner of clelinq1ie11t 
charges incurred hy the tenant, an effort to so imno~e sncll 
charges, ns was attempted unsuccessfully in the Etheredge 
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~ase, should here meet with a like result. It is submitted that 
the authorities above relied upon definitely preclude the col-
lection of the charges in question from the non-occupant owner 
of the premises. 
In the remote contingency that any doubt on the question 
should remain as to whether or not the statute in terms at-
tempts to impose this liability, in the first of which events, 
the statute would be unconstitutional and in the latte:r, c~n-
:stitutional and enforceable, aud that the statute was suscep-
tible of these two constructions, the duty of the court, in the 
face of such doubt, is clearly defined. 
28 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 640-"There is a 
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, 
and in accordance therewith, when a statute is suscep-
31 * tible «=of two constructions, one of which supports the 
act and gives it effect and the other renders it uncon-
stitutional and void, the former will he adopted, evPn though 
the latter may be the more natural interpretation of the lan-
guage us·ed. '' 
Martin v. Sou,th Saleni Lancl Co., 97 Va. 353-"Nothing is 
better settled than if two constmctions may be given a stat-
ute, one of which is clearly withh1, and the other without, the 
legislative power, the courts will hold that it intended to do 
that which it had the right to do, and not that which was 
beyond its power.'' 
1lv e therefore submit, for the rC!asons above given, tbat t11e 
attempt to impose and enforce the 'collection of charges f-or 
sewage disposal upon the plaintiff in error, in the absence of 
contract, when he has not personally occupied the premises in 
question, is a flagrant violation of his rights under the cited 
sections of the Constitution of t.hc United States and of the 
State of Virginia. 
It will perhaps be strongly urged tllat such a method is a 
convenient one from the standpoint of tb.e defendant. W c 
are unaware that constitutional rights should be subordinated 
to personal convenience. It may he true, as previously stated 
by this Court in the Etl1eredge. case approving the -decision 
_in Tur-ner v. Revere IT' atcr Com.pany, that it might be de-
sirable that a w·ater company or a gas company, in which 
category we would also inclu.de t~1e defendant in err?r, should 
l1ave an easy way of collectmp; its debts, but that ts no rea-
son whv it should he enabled by tl10 Court to collect n debt 
from one who is not a party to the contract, when it sells 
its commodity on credit. 
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Applying this principle to the case at bar, the defendant 
would not be precluded from effective methods in collecting 
the charges which should rightfully be imposed on the tenant 
In this connection the following observations may be perti-
nent:. 
While it appears from tlle evidence that tlie wateL-
32* nsed in *connection with sewage deposal in each of the 
constituent units of the apartment building is furnished 
through a common meter, there is no unsurmountable obstacle-
whereby the charges imposed by the Commission upon the 
individual tenants cannot be enforced. It will be observed 
by reference to Section 1560iii7 (b) that there are various: 
ways. of basing or computing these charges which may be 
"either _on the consumption of water on or in connection with 
tI1e real ·estate, making· due allowance for commercial use of 
water., or on the number and kind of water outlets on or in 
connection with the real estate or on tlle number and kind of 
plumbing or sewage fixtures or facilities on or in connection 
with the real estate, or on the number or average number of 
persons residing or working· on or otherwise connected 01· 
identified with the real estate or on any other factors deter:... 
mining the type, class and amount of use or service of the 
sewag·e disposal system, or on any combination of such fac-
tors.11 
It will thus be seen that taking tl1e total wa tcr consumption 
on the premises, the apportionment of this clrnrge among tlle 
r.espectivc occupants ther.eof can easily be arrived at by t11e 
application of one or the other, or a combination of tl1e fac-
tors above set out. It mfaht be observed tlmt these various 
methods were doubtless pi~-ovided with a view to meeting the 
situation here presented. 
Under Section 1560iii5 the Commission is authorized to sue 
and be sned. 
Uncler Section 1560iii7 ( d), it is provided that tT1e delinquent 
against whom the charge is made shall, as a result ·of his de--
fault, cease to dispose of sewage or industrial waste originat-
ing from or on such real estate by dischnrge thereof di-
33* rectly or indirectly in{o tlle *sewage disposal system,. 
and 'to make this provision effective, tlrn Commission 
may enter upon tl1e premises. Section 1560iii28- provides that 
any person violating· an? provisions of the CI1apter shall he 
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be· puuishecl 
accordingly. 
i 
\ 
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Assigmnent of Error No: 4. 
The Court Erred in Entering Jildgnient in Favor of the De-
fendant Against the Plai,ntiff for Said Fees, Rents 
And Other Charges. 
For the reasons hereinabove given, it is respectfully urged 
that error was committed by the trial Court in. entering judg-
ment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the fees, rents 
and charges in question. If the fore going arguments are ac-
cepted by the Court, it follows that the pecuniary judgment 
against the plaintiff is improper and should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons and upon the authorities cited, 
it is respectfully submitted that a writ of error and S'ltper-
selleas to the judgment aforesaid should be granted herein, 
and that the Court should review and reverse said judgment 
and render final judgment in favor of this petitioner. 
The original of this petition, together with a transcript of 
the record and exhibits in the cause, is forwarded to M. B. 
Watts, Esq .. , Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, Richmond, Virginia, on the 12th day of July, 1949, and 
on the same date a copy has been delivered to opposing coun-
sel. 
If a writ of error is awf1rded, petitioner will adopt 
34* this *petition as its opening brief. 
Opportunity for oral presentation of this application 
is requested. 
RespectfuI1y submitted, 
Vv. M. BOTT, 
By En,,r ARD S. FEREBEE, 
TAZEWELL TAYLOR, 
EDvV ARD S. FEREBEE, 
713 National Bank of Commerce Bldg., 
Norfolk, Virginia: 
TAZEWELL TAYLOR, 
509 Citizens Bank Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
Attorneys for the petitioner. 
His Counsel. 
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35* *We, Edwa·rd. S. Ferebee and Tazewell Taylor,1 attor-
-neys at law, practicing· in the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, do certify that in our opinion it is proper 
that the judgment and decision complained of in the fore-
going petition should be reviewed by said court. 
EDvV.ARD S. FEREBEE, 
713 National Bank of Commerce Bldg., 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
TAZEWELL TAYLOR, 
509 Citizens Bank Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Norfolk, Virginia, July 12, 1949. 
Received July 13, 1949. 
:M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error and supersedcas awarded. Bond $1.,000. 
Aug. 3, 1949. 
JOHN '"\V. EGGLESTON. 
Received August 4, 1949. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, at 
the Courthouse thereof, on the 8th day of April, in the year, 
1949. 
Be It Remembered, That heretofore, to-wit: In the Circuit 
Court aforesaid, on the 14th day of February, in the year, 
1949, came the Plaintiff, W. M. Bott, and docketed his Notice 
of Motion for Judgment against the Defendant, Hampton 
Roads Sanitation District Commission, etc., in the following 
words and figures, to-wit: 
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Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
,v. M. Bott, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission, a corpora ... 
tion duly chartered, organized and existing under the laws 
of the State of ,Virginia, Defendant. 
TO: Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission, 
The above named defendant. 
You are hereby notified that on the 14th day of February, 
1949, at 10 :00 A. M. o'clock of that day or as soon thereafter 
as counsel may be heard, the undersigned plaintiff will move 
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk at its Courthouse 
in said City, for a declaratory judgment under Virginia Code, 
Section 6140a, et seq., construing Chapter 65A, of 
page 2 } the Virginia Code of 1942, and particularly Section 
1560nn thertof, and also the provisions contained 
in Acts of the Virginia A.ssembly of 1946, Chapter 206, page 7, 
and Chapter 65A of the Virginia Code of 1942, particularly 
Section 1560iii7 (1948 Supplement). Section 1560nn, refe.rred 
to above, reads in part as follows : 
(a) Every commission is hereby authorized and empowered 
to charge and collect fees, rents, or other charges for the 
use and services of the sewage disposal system. Such fees, 
rents and charges may be charged to and collected from any 
person contracting for the same or from the owner or lessee 
or tenant, or some or all of them, who uses or occupies any 
real estate which directly or indirectly is or has been connected 
with the sewage disposal system, or from or on which origi-
nates or has originated sewage or industrial wastes, or either, 
which directly or indirectly have entered or will enter the 
sewage disposal system, and the owner or lessee or tenant of 
any snch real estate shall pay such fees, rents and charges to 
the commission at the time when and place where such fees, 
rents and charg·es are due and payable. 
(b) Such fees, rents and charges being in the nature of 
use or service charges, shall as nearly as the commission 
shall deem practicable and equitable, be uniform throughout 
the district for the same type, class and amount of 
page 3 r use or service of tpe sewage disposal system, and 
may be based or computed either on the consump-
JO S.npremc Court or Appea]s of Virginia 
tion of water on or in connection with the real estate, making 
due allowance for commercial use of water, or on the num-
ber and kind of water outlets on or in connection with the: 
real estate or on the number and kind of plumbing or sewage 
fixtures or facilities on or in connection with the real estate,. 
or on the number or average number of persons residing 
or working on or otherwise connected or identified with the 
1·eal estate or on any other factors determining the type, 
class and amount of use or service of the sewage disposal 
system, or on any combination of such factors. 
An actual antagonistic assertion and denial of the plain-
tiff's rights by said defendant under the above quoted statu-
tory provisions .obtain, and it is desired to have a clarification 
and adjudic-atioi1 of such rights and the authority of saicI 
defendant under the statutory provisions above quoted.* 
The facts leading to the controversy in question are as fol-
lows: 
The plaintiff is the o-wncr in his own right of certain apart-
ment buildings known ns the Princess .1µine Apartments, 826 
"\Vest Princess Anne Road, Armistead Bridge Court Apart-
ments, 800 \Vest Princess Anne Road,. \V estover T:crracc· 
Apartments, 825 1Vestover Avenue, and Earle Court Apart-
ments, 3421 Granby Street, all in the City of Nor-
page 4 f folk, State of Virginia. The said Princess Anne-
Apartment contains forty ( 40) individual apart-
ments units, the Armistead Bridge Apartment contains. 
twenty-four (24) individual apartment units, the Westover 
Terrace Apartment contains twenty-four (24) individual 
apartment units, and the Earle Court Apartment contains: 
forty ( 40) individual apartments units, each of said units being: 
rented to separate tenants and no portion of said buildings or 
any of the apartments therein being used or occupied by-
the f}laintiff. The said tenants or occupants have the sole, ex-
clusive occupancy, possession and use of all of the said in-
dividual apartment units,. and the plaintiff, even though the-
legal owner, Ims no right or authority to enter in or upon or 
to use, occupy or possess the same, wllich are subject entirely 
to the sole exclusive use, occupancy and possession of the· 
respective tenants therein, nor has said plaintiff contracted 
for or nndcrtnken to pay said fees, rents~ or other chargos for 
the use und service of the- clef endant 's se,,,.agc disposal sys-
tem. 
The said defendant, relying upon the statutory provisions: 
above quoted,. has· undertaken and attempted to charge and 
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collect from tfie plaintiff the fees, rents and charges imposed 
by said defendant in the nature of use or service charges au-
thorized by the'. above-quoted statutory proYisions. Bills for 
such charges, covering the period from August 27, 1948, to 
Decembe~· 29, 1948, are as fo,llows: 
Princess Anne Apartment 
Armistead Bridge Court Apt. 
vVestover Terrace Apartment 
Earle Court Apartment 
$152.20 
86.57 
93.67 
120.14 
$452.58 
page 5 ~ No portion of the said amount of $452.58 has been 
paid by the plaintiff, although the defendant asserts 
and claims that the same is due ancl· payahle at the present 
time. The defendant has jnclicatecl that future bills will be 
presented to the plaintiff for charges :similar to the above, 
and that payment will be demanded ·for the same. Such 
charges and claims on the part of the def Pnclant against the 
plaintiff are denied by the plaintiff, and gi\'O rise to an actual 
existing controversy which can only be l'esolved by an a.d-
judication of the ·i·ights mid obligations between the said 
parties. 
As a direct result of the rig·ht asserted by the defendant 
to collect from the plaintiff the cha rgcs ref fl1Ted to above, the 
Yalue of the plaintiff's interest and title in and to the afore-
~;aid apartment properties has lJeen rednecd by an am-ount 
equal at least to the capitalization of such charges on an 
mmual basis, namely: 
Annual Ch.ar,qc 
( csti-n-iated) 
Princess Anne Apartment 
Armistead Bridge Court Apt. 
,Vestovcr Tenace Apartment 
Earle Conr~ Apartment 
$ 45(i.(.i0 
259.71 
281.01 
860.42 
•:rota] reduction of value' 
Capitalized 
at 6% 
$ 7,610.00 
4,328.50 
4,683.50 
6,007.00 
$ 22,629.00 
~l'he plaintiff further aYcrR thnt the ahnn• qnoted statute, 
insofar as the Commission seeks thc1\ehy to make the owner or 
premises personally liable for the fe·es, i·ents nnd other charges· 
(which are ii1 the nature of nse or scrvic,~ eltargcs) for the use· 
and services· of the sewage disposal HyHtmn, irrespective of 
eon tract, or the use of said sewage tfo;posn I system by said 
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owner, is at;td would be repugnant to the Fourteenth 
1:>age 6 ~ AI1lendn1ei~t of the Constitution of the United States 
. . and to. Scction 11 of the Constitution of Virginia in 
that it. cl9es and wori\µ. deprive such owner of his property 
Without clue process of iaw. . 
'The plaintiff the ref oi'e as.ks, in view of the premises, that 
this Cow·t take jurisdiction of the.matter. in controversy and 
interpret the scope and extent of the stat-qtes above set out, 
:md determine whether or not; under the facts and relationship 
of the pa,rties, there is any liability on said plaintiff for said 
fees, rents and other charges, which said defendant claims 
the right to impose upon and collect from this plaintiff, it 
he~ng the contention of said plaintiff that the fair and correct 
interpretation of said statutory provisions imposes no liability 
,,pon him for the ;pa~nont of said fees, rei1ts and other 
ch?-rges; and that the Court further make binding adjudi-
cations of the rights of the respective parties hereto, and 
gflmt all sueh furth~r relief as the plaintiff may be entitled 
to. And he will ever pray. 
(s) W. M. BOTT. 
. '\Ty. M. Bott, the piai,titiff t1amccl in the foregoing bill, being 
first duly sworn, says that the facts and allegations contained 
in the s~id bill wh,i~h ·:he makes of his 9w11 knowledge arc 
. ~fo~, and that all otltcr ,:matters t\1erein stated he believes to, 
he,,irue. 
Given under my h~tud this 4th day of February, 1949. 
(s) MARY W. CROCKER, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires July 17, 1951. 
I 
TAZEWELL TAYLOR and 
EbW ARD S. ~,EUFIBEE, p. q. 
t>age 7 r And on the same clay, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
:ri < aforesaid, on the 14th day of February, in the year, 
b49: 
Up.on the motion of the plaintiff, by counsel, it is ordered 
~hat thi~ notice of motion be docketed. · And thereupon came 
fhe. parties, br counse~, ~nd said clefe:qdant pleaded the gen-
l~~al issue to which s.aid plaintiff replied g·enerally and issue is 
jdihed; aml the further· hearing is continuctl. 
... ~-·.' 
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Auel on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court aforesaid, -
on the day and year first hereinabove written., vfa . ., on the 
8th c..ay of April, in the year, 1949: · 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, anti this pro-
ceeding was heard in open court on the written motion of the 
plaintiff and the answer and cross-claim of the defendant, 
this i.ay filed by leave of Court, and the cause was argued by 
counsel for the respective parties. . 
On consideration whereof, it is the judgment of .the Court 
that the defendant Hampton Roads Sanitation District Com-· 
mission_ is entitled. ~o collect its ~barges for sewage dispo~al 
emanatmg· from Prmcess ·Anne Apartments, 826 "\,Vost Pr111-
<>ess Anne Road, Armistead Bridge Court Apartrllents, 800 
'\Vest Princess Anne Road, Westover T.errace Apartments, 
:S25 Westover A venue, and Eai·le Court Apartments, 3421 
Granby Street, all in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
page 8 } from the plaintiff W. M. Bott as the owner of all 
of said apartments, so long as such plaintiff. uses or 
occupies the real estate consist!ng 9f said apartment buildinps 
anc! the sa111e are connocted with the defendant's sewage d1s-
110snl f?YStem, and so long· as sewage or industrial waste con-
tinlles to enter the sewage disposal system of the defendant, 
and the Court cloth so declare; . · 
And it appearing to the Court from the conclusioH which it 
has reached, and which is set forth and declared in thJs order, 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in this cnilse,. but 
that the defendant is entitled to conseque1itial relief 1,mder its 
cross-claim for the ~fuount. o:f such charges imposed against 
the plaintiff by the defendant which have accrued aiia become 
past due and payable, accordingly, . thij said defendant is 
awarded a judgment ag~inst the plaintiff in the pi'incipal sum 
of Six Hundred eighty-two and 73/100 Dollars, with interest 
thereon from the entry of this judgment until paid at Six ( n%) per cent per auiium and the costs of this proceeding. 
And the snicl plaintiff having evidenced au intention to 
npply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a 
writ of error to the terms of, this jndgme1it, the operation here-
of is suspended for a period of sixty ( 60) days upon the said 
lJlaintiff, 01· someone for him, entering into bond before the 
Clerk of this Court in the penalty of Three Hundred Dol-
lars, with good nnd sufficient security conditioned n:.ccording 
to law. 
11age 9 } The following is the Answer and Cross Claim filed 
by lC'avc of the foregoing order: · 
Supveme (Jourt of .Appeaifs of Vitginiia 
For answer to the complaint exhibited against it in tlle 
above captioned matter, or so much thereof as this defendant 
is advised should be answered, defendant says.: 
1. Defendant admits that plaintiff is. the owner in his own: 
rig·ht of Princess Anne Apartments,. Armistead Bridge Court 
Apartments,. Westover Terrace Apartments and Earle Court. 
.Apartments as set forth in his complaint. Defendant denies 
that no portion· of said buildings or any of the apartments 
therein are .used or occupied by the plaintiff, but avers that 
on the contrary, on information and belief, the plaintiff is. 
using all,. each and every one of said apartment buildings toi 
obtain revenues or profits therefrom; that he is using the-
water lines in said T:milding·s to distribute ,vater which he pur-
chases to the several parts of each of said buildings, and that 
he uses the sewerage lines· in each of said buiidillc<YB to dis-
charge tlle same water plus other waste materials into the· 
disposal system of the defendant Commission. Defendant 
denies the allegation tllat plaintiff has not contra:eted for the· 
use and services of" the defcndant"s sewerage disposal sys-
tem, and says that on the contrary the plaintiff, by availing; 
himself of the use and services of the defcndan:t'sr sewerage 
disposal system, has contracted for such use- and unde:rtakern 
to pa:v its charg·es. 
2. Def'endant admits tiiat it has imposed the charges set-
forth in the compl~int and attempted to collect 
page 10 f same, and says that it is leg-nlly entitled to eoHee,-1 
same from the plaintiff. Defendant l)Tays- that this 
nmnr-er ·will be treated as a cross claim and tliat the Court 
will adjudiratc in this cause tbat it is entitled to co11ect such 
charges and additional cirnrges wllich have accrued and be-
come due and payable since the institution of this suit, an(l 
that the Court will by way of consequential relief award the· 
defendnnt judgment against tlle plaintiff in this cause for so, 
nmrfr ns may I1aYe accrued amt become past drre and pay-
able·. 
· 3. Defendant denies Hmt its aetfons and tmc.Tertakings fmyc• 
1 n any w·ay deprived plaintiff of his property withom dne~ 
process of'lnw, and says timt no cctnstitutiorraf qncstiorr, S'fatc-
~r Yedernf, is presented in tllis eausc. That the eha:.rges 
made by defendant against this- plaintiff m"C not tt tax,. noth 
an assessment, nor an i"mposition uy public auH10rity to wllich 
plaintiff ir..; required to submit; hut on tile contrary plaintiff\;: 
liability for such charges depends entirely upon his voluntan-
(1Qfo1:miuation to t1};e or not to use the fnc-i.Iitic~s of this d<!-
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fendant. That plaintiff l1as elected to use such facilities by 
using them. 
4. Defendant admits the existence of an actual controve~sy 
nnd the jurisdiction of this Court, and :asserts that' while the 
plaintiff is entitled to no relief_fa this cause the defendant is 
entitled to- consequential relief in the form of a judgment 
against the plaintiff for the charges against him which are 
delinquent and unpaid accruing from his use of the facilities: 
of this defendant. 
page 11 r HAMPTON ROADS SANITATION DISTRICT 
COMMISSION, , r • 
By: (s) JAMES M. MORRIS, Jr., · :, 
RICHARD B. KELLAN and 
W. R. ASHBURN, 
Counsel for Def cndant. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, To-wit: 
Acting Manager. 
: i 
i I.· 
I, Richard B. Kellam, a Notary Public- of and for the City 
aforesaid in the State of ,Virginia, whose notarial commission 
expires on the 7th day of November, 1949, do certify that 
.James M. Morris, Jr., whose name as Acting Manager .of 
Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission is. signed to 
the foregoing answer, personally appeared before me and 
being first duly sworn made oath that he has read the fore-
going answer, knows the contents thereof and believes t.he 
same to be true. 
· Given under my hand this 14th day of March, 1949 . 
. (s) RICHARD B. KELLAM, 
Notary Public. · · 
The foll~wing is. the Certificate of Exc.cptions in the ab~,~e 
styled case: 
page· 12 ~ In the ·Circuit Court of·the City of Norfolk; 
Virgfoia. 
'?· M. Bott, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Hampton Roa<ls Sanitation District ·Commission, a corpora~ 
tion duly chartered, organized nncl c•.xisting under the Jaws 
of tl1e State of Virginia, Dcfendm1t._ 
36. Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
NOTICE OF .APPEAL. 
To.~ Messrs. Ashburn, A.gelasto & Sellers (Mr. Willard R. 
· Ashbur1i) and .Messrs. Kellam & Kellam (Mr. Richard B . 
. Kellam), attorneys for the defendant: 
;[>LEASE TAKE NOTICE, That on the 12th day of May, 
19~9, the undersigned will present to the Honorable Clyde H. 
lacob, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, at the courthouse of said city, the stenographic report 
of· the testimony and other proceedings of the trial of the 
above-entitled case for certification by said Judge, and will, 
on the same date, make application to the Clerk of said court 
for a transcript of the· record in said case, for the purpose 
of presenting the snmc to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia with a petition for a writ of error and sitpersedeas 
to the final judgment of the trial court in said case. 
vV. M. BOTT, 
By: TAZE'WELL TAYLOR and 
ED,v ARD s. FEREBEE, 
his attorneys. 
By EDWARD S. FEREBEE, 
Of Counsel. 
.L.egal service of the a,bove notice is hereby accepted, this 
~th 'day of·:May, 1H49. · 
RICHARD B. KELLAM. 
page 13 ~ In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. 
W. M. Bott, Plai11tiff, 
v. 
Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission, a corpora-
tion duly charterHd, o_rganized and existing under the laws 
of the State of Virginia, Defendant .. 
TRANSCHIPT OF TESTIMONY. 
Stenographic transcript of the testimony introduced and 
proceedings had upon the trial of the above-entitled case, in 
said court, on the 17th day of March, 1949, before the Hon01·-
able Clyde IL .Jacob, Judge of said court. 
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Walter M. Bott. 
Appearances: Messrs. Tazewell Taylor and Edward S.. 
Ji''erebee, counsel for the plaintiff. 
Messrs. Ashburn, Agelasto & Sellers (By Mr. ·wmard R. 
Ashburn) and Messrs. Kellam & Kellam (by Mr. Ri~hard B. 
Kellam) counsel for the defendant. 
1mge 14} (The witnesses were sworn, opening statements 
were made by counsel, and the following evidence 
was introduced : ) · 
WALTER M. BOTT, 
the complainant, having been first duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
l~xamined by !fr. Taylor: 
Q. Mr. Bott, will you state your name and residence: 
A. vValter :M. Bott; 940 Jamestown Crescent, Norfolk, Vir-
ginia. 
Q. And what is your business 7 
A. R.eal estate, insurance, hotel, and some other. 
Q. Yon arc the plaintiff in this proceeding, are you not 1 
A. I am. 
Q. And in there, you have alleged that you are the owner 
of four separate and distinct apartment buildings of the 
dtyt 
A. I am. 
Mr. Taylor: For the purpose of the record, I will read 
1hem, Your Honor. 
The Court : Very well. sir. 
Mr. Taylor: Princess Anne Apartments, 826 West Prin-
c·<~ss Anne Road; Armistead Bridge Court Apartments, 800 
,Vest Princess Anne Road; ,vestover Terrace Apartments, 
825 Vv estover Avenue; and Earle Court Apart-
1mge 15 ~ ments, 3241 Granby Street; all in the City of Nor-
folk, Virginia. 
Bv Mr. Tavlor ~ 
· Q. That is true, is it not 1 
.A. It is .. 
Q. Can you state the number of individual apartment units 
in the Princess Anne Apartments 1 
A. I can. It is 40. 
Q. And in the Armistead Bridge Apartments! 
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A .. 24 .. 
Q. And in the Westover Terrace Apart:rnentsr 
A .. 24. 
Q .. And in the Earle Court Apartments! 
A. 40. 
Q. Now, wm yon explain generally to tile C'O'Urt just tf:rC> 
layout of those: apartments, whether they aTc· separate am.I 
distinct units.:~:rj:ust what their character is t 
A. They are .. separate and distinct units that are rented to, 
tenants who have exellISive use of the apartments so long as. 
the lease is in effeet. 
Q. And they open on a common ha:111 do tlmyt 
A. They do .. 
Q. Under tne terms of your lease, as applied to each anct 
every one of these- apartments; what rights llawe yon so far 
as, possession or tI1e right to enter upon any one- of the units r 
Mr-. Asb.harn: Objection, if Your Honor please). 
page- 16. f on the ground that the lease instrument betwecrt 
the larrcll(})rd and the- tenant is the- bQ!s.t ev.idence:.. 
Tl.Jc· Court: The ohjection .i:s sustained. 
By :Mr. Taylor: 
Q. Can you prvduce a: sample· loose ot cgi,'CJ:ii ~m~ of" tliose-
apartrnerrts Y 
A .. Yes.. I tI1ink they a:re-
°"· Will you do. that durin o·. the• 1'.)·ro·o-ress· of t.lii"s case °l' 
~· • ::,. J; I:). -
A .. I wilT.. 
Mr. Taylor:- Witli.ont delaying" the; hearin:g.;_ Your H~mo1-r 
we would lrka to have tlic· oppoTtunity ~ 
The- Co.ttl't : All. rigliti s.fr;; you may .. 
By Jfr. 'Fary ro1·: 
Q~ And the lease- defines tfie. re.:Tu:tiou liet\\:-cen- yon and encli: 
@ne of yonr tenants;! 
A .. It doos .. 
Q .. What use have· you: of' tli~se- a:partmen:is: wbfoI1 are- nncfor 
renti· 
:M:1-~. AshbmTf:- Objected to as· caUing for rr fog-aT 0concfusion,. 
Your Honor. · 
The Court: That calls for a constructi011 of ilie lease,. what 
rig·hts he bm, in tJie p1:cmises~ -
W. l\L Bott v. Rampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm. 3!> 
f.Valter M. Bott.' 
Mr. Taylor: Well, sir, we will await that. 
page 17 ~ By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. On the question involved in this case of the 
matter of fees, rents and other charges made by the defen-
dant Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission, state 
whether or not you have contracted for any such charges Y 
A. I have not. 
Q. State whether or not you have agreed to pay any such 
chargesf · · ·· 
A. I have not. . 
Q. State whether or not you liave used directly or indirect-
ly this sewerage system that ·is operated by the Hampton 
Roads Sanitation District Commission Y 
A. The only use I have had· of it is some facilities in the 
basements of the various apartments that the caretaker will 
use, such as a sink and commode. And I would certainly say 
that the water used by the careta'lrnr will not exceed the water 
used by any tenant in that building, or in that particular 
building. . 
Q. State whether or not you stand ready, able and willing 
to pay your proportionate part, bused upon just what you 
have said as to use of the facility'! 
A. I do. 
Mr. Ashburn: Objected to, Your "II onor please, because 
any question as to tl1e reasonableness or propriety of .the 
amount of tlie charge again.st J\fr. Bott can be de-
page 18 ~ termined only in the manner prescribed by the 
statute, by application to the State Corporation 
Commission. · 
The Court: The Court will decide 1.ho principle that the 
individual payment will be proper. Whether he is willing to 
pay or unwilling to pay, he has to pny if the Court holds that 
each user woultl have to pay. He admitted that lie is one of 
the users. 
Mr. Taylor: As to thnt particnlnr irn~trumentality. 
The Court: ·w11ether he says he is willing to pay or not, 
if the Court should so hold that tho us(H'S individnnlly should 
pay, he comes in that category on liii,; tm;timony already in. 
!fr. Ashburn: But om· point is that Your Honor can not 
decide in this cause whether the tenant 01· the landlord shoulcl 
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pay. You can only determine whether there is a rig·ht on the 
part of the Commission to make a charge to the fee simple 
owner of these properties. 
Now, illustrating·, if the charge made is $100 and the fee 
~imple owner says it ought to be $1.00, then his exclusive 
means of relief is prescribed by statute and it is by applica-
tion to the State Corporation Commission. 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. I hand you certain bills rendered by the Hampton Roads 
Sanitation District Commission and ask you whether you 
received those bills? 
A. Y cs, sir, I did. 
page 19 ~ Q. And arc those the bills that are ref erred to in 
your notice of motion for judgment in this case? 
A. Thev arc. 
Q. I no"'tice that these hills are made out not in individual 
names but in the name of the Westover Terrace Apartment8, 
Earle Court Apartments, Princess Anne Apartments and Ar-
mistead Bridge Court Apartments? 
A. That is right. 
Q. That is the condition in which those bills were originally 
rendered YOU,., 
A. Yes; sir.' 
Mr. Taylor: I would like to file those as an exhibit. 
(The bills referred to were marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. And you have declined to pay those bills, for the reasons 
you have indicated! 
A. That is right. 
Q. As a matter of fnet, do you, or not, go on the premises 
representing the individual units leased by you to various 
tenants? 
Mr. Ashburn: You mean ,vbether he personally walked 
into the apartme11ts! 
Mr. Taylor: No, I am asking him first as to 
page ·20 ~ l1imself. I will then come to his ag·ent. 
A. I do not unless hy special permission of tho tenant. 
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By Mr. Ta:vlor: 
· Q. I will°' now ask you the same question with referen~ to 
your agents or duly authorized representatives. Do they go 
upon those premises? 
A. They do not. They have express, explicit instructions 
from me not to enter an apartment that is under lease. 
Q. And will you g-et a typical lease for each ·one of these 
-apartments during the course of the hearingf 
A. I will. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Ashburn: . 
· Q. Mr. Bott, let's devote our attention first to the Princess 
Anne Apartments. You have already said that that is a build-
ing containing 40 dwelling units! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I suppose that as of the present time each one of those 
40 dwelling units are rented to tenants 1 
A. Thev are. 
Q. N °'v, approximately how many stories do the buildings 
comprise? 
A. Four stories. . 
Q. And these apartments or dwelling· units are 
png·e 21 } on each of the four stories to the building? 
A. Yes. 
Q . .Some on each story? 
A. They are. 
Q. I would assume that the lease to each tenant entitles 
that tenant to dwell in the apartment designated by number 
or some other description? 
A. It does. 
Q. Well, now, what public space is there in the entire apart-
ment building; tlrn t is, space not let to the possession of any 
individual tenant 1 
A. Public hall and the basement. 
Q. Vv ell, then, is the public hall on each of the four floors? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And there is a basement below the four floors? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you have a manager or a custodian or an employee 
representative living on the premises t 
A. So far as I linow, the Princess Aune, the Armistead 
Bridg·e Court, the Westover Terrace lrns no such occupancy. 
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The Ea:rie, Court do.es have a janitor that stays ©n tbe prem-
ises part time .. 
Q. Well,. now-
A. The, basement, in one· basement rO'om. 
page 22 ~ Q. Dealing still with the Princess Anne, Apart-
ments, how a:re tTle spaces in the· entire building: 
not given uncTer lease to the possession of tenants,. cleaned or-
otherwise' -cared f 01· 1 
A. The tenhnts clean tlieir own apairtmenis,: the ones they 
occupy .. 
Q. What happens to the Imlls! · 
A. The janitor cleans tha:L 
Q. ·wnat happens to the basementf 
A. The janitor cleans iL 
Q. Are there any lavatories-, sinirs OT basements· in any part 
of' the bnilding· exclusive of the dwelling \lnits leased to ten-
ants? 
Ar Yes. A sink in tile basement and a commode, in the· base:... 
ment of tiie· apartment Tmildfog.s~ 
Q. One or more than one T 
A .. It's p1·obably two in the Armistead Bridge· Court and~ 
one in the Princess· Anne; two in the Earle Court; one in tl1e· 
Westover Terrace. 
Q. vVell, now, Mr. Bott, stilI devoting our- attention to the· 
Pdncess Anne-, state wI1etlier· o:r not you. navC' a. central beat-
ing system for the builciingJ 
.A .. I do,. 
Q .. So· that heat is furnislicd by you a:s owner fo a:II of your 
dwelling t~nanis on tfle premises? 
page 23 f .A. It is 
Q. And wl1at sort m Ii.eating system is that ·y 
A. Steam heat .. 
Q~- And do:es. that imrolv.e the- ns~ of water irr the- heating-:-
svstem r 
" A.~ It does~ Tmt tT:re system is" so c011structed tirn:t it pro-baory-
would not use over 100 gallons per year, because the'. same., 
wateT heats over and over again. 
Q. Is sucl1 water as is used in the Ii.eating· sysfenr dis-
charged into- the sewerage disposal lines 1 
A. No. WI1err tli.ey drain the water· system, it is drained 
out by a spigot on. tl1e side of the- hoileir; and that is done· 
probafJly orrcc a year uniess we have trouble with the boiler;. 
which is not often.. Now, they mig·bt take a bucketful of 
water, pour it in the sink and let it drain that way .. 
Q~ 'rhat is the only place they· can pour it!: 
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A. As far as I know. 
Q. What? 
A. Thev could. Th~y cou_ld probably pour it in the com-
mode. I have seen them do that sometime. 
Q. Well, at any rate, it goes through the sewerage disposal 
system? · · · . 
A. I imagine so. I don't know where it goes after it leaves 
tllere. 
page 24 ~ Q. AIJ rigl1t, sir. Now, concerning the use of 
water on the premises by anyone in possession of 
any part of the premises, is that from the water distribution 
system of the City of Norfolk? · 
A. Would you ask me that question again, please. 
Q. Any water used on the premises, does it come from the 
water distribution system of the City of N orfolkt · 
A. Yes, supposed to. ·we are-piped into the building. 
Q. Do you purchase the water from the City of Norfolk? 
A. I do. .. 
Q. And pay the City of Norfolk its charges for the water, 
consumed on said premises t 
A. I do. 
Q. And is it not the fact that every commode in the entire 
bu~lding-w11en I say ''commode,'' I mean "toilet"-is oper-
ated by means of water coming· from the water system of the 
City of Norfolkt 
A. It is a fact. 
Q. And the same answer would apply to every bathtub, 
shower and "basin f 
A. That is right. 
Q. Is it not also the fact that every hit of that water when 
it has been used, goes off as waste matter through the sewer-
age disposal system 1 
page 25 ~ A. I wonlcl not know, :\fr. Ashbum. 
Q. Certainly, all passing through the shower~, 
tubs, toilets and basins goes off through the sewerage dis-
posal system f 
A. I would not know whctbcr it is even connected up or not. 
Q. Where else would it discharg·c.·, lVlr. Bott 1 How else 
could it discharge ·r 
A. I would not know, I say. I nm not familiar with tlmt 
system. 
Q. Do you know whether or not it g·oes into the citf sewer-
age f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know where it goes? 
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A. No, sir. It is supposed to go in the sewers btlt I don't 
kriow that it does. 
, Q~ :Mr~ Bott; ~Toil a1~ti iilc.lividHally the owner of these four 
buildings 1 
· A~ 1· a1tt. i.~tH,. sir. 
.-, . . ' :J ' • . Q. ·wen, now, concerning. the subjects tl~a.t we have just 
ht!thi iitqtiit"hig- oil, tli~ satHe rtns,Ytn~s as you liaye tiveil about 
the Princess Anne Aparhnents apply as , well tb the other 
Hii"ee, witli the siiig·le exception that in the Eade tJoutt .A.part-
m~1its; ybtit· 1Jaltl l'ffffrtis~i1tath1e- live~ on tbe iWemises j 
A. Yes. That is iny uridei"staiiditig. He has a 
i>agc 26 ~ room ther~ _and I imagine he spends most of liis 
, . tiine at tiiM"ht 111 that fobiii. . . _ 
ij. The purchase aiH:l tlistfibutidii of watei~, the cHstfibution 
of waste riI~ttei· and all other afra1,1gerii~iits ~ii'e the sarii~ so 
far as Jou k1io,v foi· H:m fom~ bhildings Y A.~ Yes; 
· Q. Yo\'i buy the water in every instance from the city ~;nd 
His Us~u in the ,hittfr liiies ahd sewerage lifi~s iii ydtit build-
ihgs 1 . 
l- So far ns I know. I buy the wat,er f.rorµ the city~ 
Q. ,v.eit, iio,v, :Mr. l3ott, as _the ii1dividual o,vner of these 
fotlr building;~; )"OU riN! µsing them ftlr profit; iii'e you not' A.. I afh ti-)·irig to ~et sotne j:frofi.t out of Hiein; yes, sir. 
Q. And-
M:r. Tayloi·: ,vc Will agree with thaL 
Bf _Mr. Ashburn: , . 
ij. If as a result df the rental of s,pace i~1 those building·s 
a pfofit N!stdts; thtni you are i1sing· the biiilditigis ftfr profit? 
¥r. l1aylor: . I o~ject. to that. 
tr1ifl Court: That calls for a conclusion. He can state the 
H~i tliat lie did make ri profit. 
Mr. Ashburn: It do(?s not make any difference, Y9ur Jlorior, 
. so long- as he is ti~yirlg to tnnke a prdflt. That is 
tfage ~7 t tlw cfi tetitlh. 
Mr. Ferebee: It makes a differe1ice to hiiri. 
thd dourt: Ai)arhrleilts are not run for chadtahle pur-
poses, qrdinarily. 
By Mr. Ashburn: 
·Q. Mr. Bott, tho ownership and rental of aparbnent dwell-
ing units is a business with you? 
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A; yes, I would .say SO:. 
Q. Now, each, all and every oiie of these bilildittgs is cori.-
nccted with the se:werage disposal sy~tem, whose u~tiinate dis-
JJdsition is tlirbug·h th~ facilities of the I-IAmptoh Roads Sani-
tation Disti'ict Commission; is it iioU 
l\Ir. Taylor: He said he did not know:. 
A. I dou 't know, Mi·. Ashburn. I received a bill from the 
Sanitation Commission on my home. I paid that E,tnd I un-
derstand now that has not even been hooked up to the sewef-
;tge. So the same thing might apply to tliese other apart-
ments. 
ffv Mr. Ashbur11: 
· Cl You achtaliy cltin 't ltrio,v? 
~. No, sir. 
Q. Did you not have sortie confcren~es with representa-
tives of the Commission in order to find out, di· in which 
that subject was discussed Y 
A. I have talked to Reid Digges on a few occasions but 
the ihfotmatioh I received ,vas not auth~ntie, I 
})age 28 } don't think; He could not tell me himself at that 
time. 
Q. You refer to Digges; he was the former manager for 
the District Commission T 
A. Yes. I don't think I discussed it with Digges within the 
past seven or eight months. 
Q .. :M:r. Bott, you did pay sdni~ of the bills s1tbinHted by 
the Commission for charges on these apartment buildings? 
A. I did, yes, sir. 
Mr. Taylot: Paid lihdei" pi·otest. 
By Mr. Ashbmri: 
·Q . .A.rtd they were pt-ior in date to those that are in con-
troversy? 
A. Yes~ sir. They were paid under protest. 
Q. Mt. Bott, as to M~h of tliese apartme1i~ buildings, is it 
the fact that there is onlv one main line f cfr the transmission 
of water coming· into the premises to each building? 
A. I really r.ould not teU you. I imagine that is a fact. 
I have not investigated. As long as I recei~ecl water-I pur-
chased them set up, ahd so long as I receive the Jjropcr water, 
I am not interested further. 
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Q. So far as yon know, there is only one wa.ter meter· at 
each premises, each building t 
A. So. far as I know. 
Q. And so far as y.ou know, is. there only one-
page 29. f discharge line from each building. out of which g.oes, 
the waste water and sew.ag~ t 
A. So far as I know. 
RE-DIRECT E..tUMINATION~ 
By Mr .. Taylor:. 
Q. As I understand, Mr. Bott,. you paid a form.er bill under 
protest! . . 
A. I did; yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state whetlier or not each individual apart-
ment can be discormect~d from the g~neral sewerage sys-
tem! 
A ... I am snre it can, hut if it cannot at this time,. it can be: 
so fixed. that it can be. 
Q. And that is no.t a major operationr is iH 
A. No,. sir. 
Q. Did you. or not,. have sewerage disposal for these four 
npartments of yours prior to the inaug1iration of the service-
of the defenda11t Hampton Roads. Sanitation District Commis-
sion! 
A.. S'e'\\reragcr disposal r. 
Q .. Yes, siF·. 
A. Yes, sir ; I did. 
Q. State whether or not in ye:m.1' opini<m the vaf11e· of your-
property has been enhanced t 
Mr. Asliburn: Objected to, if Yorrr Honor pTease- There b~: 
no qrrestiorr of value he-re, none whatever. 
page 30' ~ I\fr. Taylor:- There is a question of specfa:l beue-
:fit. That is one phase of this matfor. 
'MIT' .... A.sMmrM-: 'l'here is no question of special benefit_ 
The Court:- The entire situation developed by the establish-
ment of tTlis quasi eorpon1tion, public- service corporation,. 
the Sanitation Commission-whether or not people as· tr whole-
Tutve been benefited-is immaterial. \Whether or not he has: 
T)enefited or whether er llot someone else worrld be benefited! 
i~ a general question, does not seem to he properly applicable· 
to. this case. 
Mr. 1\.shburn :· That is pmely a matter 0£ legislative con-
ecrn, as we conte~. 
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The Court: If you can show that he is in a class by him-
self, that he has been harmed and ~veryoue else has been 
benefited, still he would have to suffer in a public matter of 
this kind. 
Mr. Taylor: We withdraw· that question, Your Honor. I 
don't think it is material. 
That is all. 
Mr. Ashburn: If he will say they are similar, we will 
not require him to produce all of his leases, just a representa-
tive one. 
The Court : All arc alike, I suppose ; just one 
page 31 ~ lease. 
Mr. Ferebee: One lease for each building. 
Mr. Taylor: That is all, Your Honor. 
LITTLETON W. TAZEWELL, 
called as a witness on behalf of the respondent, and having 
been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Kellam : 
Q. Will yon tell the court your name, please, sid 
.A. Littleton vY. Tazewell. 
Q. What is our. occupation 1 
A. Design engineer for the Hampton Roads Sanitation Dis-
trict Commission. 
Q. How long have you been engaged in the engineering 
business¥ 
A. I hate to admit it. I graduated 38 years ago. 
Q. Are you familiar with the sewer lines of the City of 
Norfolk and of the Hampton Roads S,p1itation District Com-
mission 1 
A. I am. 
Q. ·wm you teH the Court whet.her or not the apartment 
house known as the Princess .Anne A parhnents is connecte<l 
with the sewer lines of the Hampton Roads Sanitation District 
Commission 1 
A. It. is connected. 
page 32 ~ Q. A.re the sewer lines of the apartment known 
as the Armistead Bri<lgc ..::\purtments c.onnectcd 1 
A. Yes. 
· Q. And the "\V cstoYcr Apartments f 
A. Yes. 
Q. A.nd the Earle Court Apartments? 
.A.. Yes. 
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Q. Is the waste material from those apartments dischargell 
t.hrough the facilities of the Hampton Roads Sanitation Dis-
trict Commission? · 
A. It is. 
Q. And is that waste material treated in the treatment 
plants of the Commission? 
A. It is. 
Q. You don't know anything about the bills or the amount 
of the charges? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. :Mr. Tazewell, has that condition existed for a period of 
more than six months; have those connections been made for 
a period of more than six months f 
A. Have the connections to the treatment plant been? 
Q. That is right. 
A. More than six months Y Yes. 
page 33 ~ JAl\fES W. MORRIS, JR., 
called as a witness on behalf of the respondent, and 
having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. You are ..Mr .• James "\V. l\Iorris, Jr. 7 • 
A. That is right. 
Q. A.nd you are the acting manager for the Hampton Roads 
Sanitation District Commission 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Mr. Morris, you are also in charge of the billing and 
accounts of the Commission 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, will you tell the Court, please, what sum is now 
due and owing by the Princess Anne Apartments or by Mr. 
W. M. Bott as the owner of that apal"trnent. 
Mr. Taylor: That is a legal question. He can testify to 
any fact. 
The Court: He can say what his books sho~.;.-. 
.' . 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Sho,,r what your books reflect as to the account charged 
to the Princess Anne Apartments or Mr. Vv. M. Bott as the 
owner of that apartment, as of this date! 
A. -wen, unfortunately, I have not got these months added 
·up, Mr. Kelimn. 
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Q. Give it to us for the various months. 
page 34 } A. Yes, sir. The bill for the month ending Sep-
tember 27 was $39.10. For October 25-
Q. That is 1948, September, 1948 J 
A. That is correct, sir. October 25, 1948, $"34.97. November 
29, 1948, $36.23. December 27, 1948, $41.90. January 26, 1949, 
,$37.42. February 24, $34.76. 
Q. Now give us those :figures with reference to the Arm-
lstead Bridge Court Apartments? 
A. For the month ending September 27, 1948, $23.00. No-
yember 25, 1948, $24.87. That is October 25; I beg your pardon~ 
November 29, $19.08. December 27, $19.62. January 26, 1949, 
'$28.25. February 24, 1949, $17.64. 
Q. Now, give us the figures with reference to the \Vestover 
Trerracc Apartments 1 
A. 1V estover ¥ 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. September 27, 1948, $25.04. October 25, 1948, $21.04. 
November 29, $18.15. December 27, $29.44. January 26, $21.89. 
},ebruary 24, $21.63. 
Q. Eatlc Court is the next one. 
The Court: Have you totaled those amounts? 
The 'Witness: I have not, unfortunately. 
A. September 28, $31.33. October 26, $28.53. November 26, 
$30.14. December 29, $30.14. January 27, $28.18. February 
25, $29.09. 
11age 35 } Mr. Kellam: That is alL 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
13v Mr. Ferebee~ 
··Q. Mr. Morris, do you have the ledger sheets in your hand? 
Is that what yon arc reading from? 
A. That is rigM. 
Q. :May I see them, please. 
A. This is the actual ledger on which the credits are made, 
which is the other encl of the bill. This is the consumption 
1·ecord sheet on which the original bill is also computed. 
Q. You arc referring in your latter statement to the yellow 
sl1eet entitled "';'\Tcstover Terrace Apartments"? 
A. That is conect; with W. l\L Bott and Company. This 
js tl1e notation that they, accol'ding· to the City Water De-
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partmentr are respensible for the water bill and to whom OUT 
bill is to be sent. ' , 
Q. Now, I notice, Mr. Morris, tha:t this. yellow sheet which! 
I hold in my hand, which presumably is taken from your 
Iedger, bearing at the top the notation ''Hampton.Roads San\-
tatim1 District Commission Monthly Consumption Record'' y 
has under the description of the property in the. upper right-
hand corner the .name ''"\\Testover Terrace Apartments, 825-
Wesfover Avenue, Norfolk 7., Virginia; 24 apartments."! 
A .. Yes, sir. 
page 36 f ·Q. Your boofrs are set up,. then, I take it,. from 
au examination of this ledger sheet,. to show th~ 
premises in question, where water is consumed;. is that cor-
rect? 
A. Well,. our records have- fo parallel those of the W atcr 
Department because-in other words, our original :records: 
were set up from the ,v.ater Department's records and that 
is the way that heading ap,pears on that plate-. 
Now, in addition to that, we found out the responsibility 
for the water bilI was in the name of W. M. Bott ancl Company 
nnd we also had that record certified hy the City that those· 
bills were sent to that- IJ 
Q. Does that appear on there anywhere, that you have.· 
n certification that ·w. M. Bott, individua:llyr is liable for any. 
water on the premises.? 
A. ,ve have VV. M. Bott as a notation. 
Q·. But V\T. l\f. Bott ffnd. Company is. not 1lv. :M:. Bott incTi-
,·i<lnallv 7 
A. Vl ell, no, $fr, it is not. 
Mt\ Asiiimrrr: It was testified tfurt I1e pm·clmsed the water:. 
.1L (Continuing} This is the mailing address, :Mr: Ferebee~ 
Bv iHr. Fcrebe-e: 
· Q .. Mr. Morris, Iias yo'l1r Commission eve-r inYestigated to, 
find out who is the legal o-wncr oif the V:lestoYer 
page 37 f Terrace Apartmc11ts Y 
A. No, sfr. 
(~. Docs it ever make sncI1 mI investigatfon before setting-
np one of tliese ledger sliects us to the consumption of water 
on any promises? 
Mr~ Ashburn:: Objected to as iinmateriaL 
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· The Court: The Notice of Motion sets up the ownership, 
I take it. Did you set up in the Notice of Motion owner-
ship of the property? What are you going to accomplish 
by it? 
Mr. Ferebee: To show that the ledger sheets and the billing 
by the Commission are made to the property and not to an in-
<li vidual. The statute does not permit a charge to the prop-
erty but only to the individual. 
Mr. Ashburn: It makes no legal difference. That is not 
charged to the property. w· e are charging Mr. Bott by the 
answer in this suit. 
The· Court: · Continue the exaniimfricm. 
By M:r. Ferebee: 
Q. Mr. Morris, I was asking you questions along this line: 
In setting up your records of the Commission, did the Com-
mission make any attempt to ascertain the legal owner of any 
premises on which watei· was consumed 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It likewise made no such investigation as to 
page 38 ~ these four apartments that we arc concerned about 
here today? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you make any. investigation as to the persons 
actually occupying the premises? 
.A. vV e did not. 
Q. I believe you said that your records were taken over, 
or, rather, copies were made from the records of the Division 
of ·water 8upply of the City of Norfolk? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So that your billing in no sense represents an investi-
gation on the part of the Commission as to the person or per-
sons actually using the water that got"ls into those premises 1 
A. I would say yes, but I would like to a<l<l something. Is 
that possible 1 · 
The Court: Answer it in your own wny. 
A. (Continuing) The records were taken from the City 
·water Department's records aucl, natnrully, we assumed thaf 
in view of the fact that they had been billing these particular .. 
individuals involved, such as, for inshlnec, those accounts 
are set up under the name of W. M. Bott nncl Company as a= 
point to which those bills would be mailed. There was no· 
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question, for instance, about the first two bills that were sent 
to each of these apartments. They were paid by W. M. Bott 
and Company. We did not feel that any further 
page 39 ~ investigation in that connection would be neces-
. sary. Now, if there had been some question about 
ownership or question about who would be responsible for 
the bill, why, we then do investigate. We do have some 
cases of that kind and we have a special man who docs make 
such an investigation. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. Mr. Morris, you admit, do you not, that the first bill or 
the first two bills paid by Mr. Bott on any of these four bill-
ings were paid under protest? 
A. Oh, that is correct. 
Q. You know thatY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you were put on notice that there was some question 
about the liability as to these four buildings, were you not? 
A. ·well, now, as I recall the letter that we got, it was not a 
question of protesting or from that particular standpoint, 
hut it was protesting as to his individual responsibility. And 
that was c~early brought out, of course, in several conferences 
we have had on the subject before us. 
Q. Mr. Morris, on this ledger sheet which I hold in my hand 
o.f the vVestover Terrace Apartments, I find pencil notations 
down in the lower left-hand corner, from which I think you 
read as to the amount of water consumed on the premises? 
A. ,v ell, I read the amount in dollars and cents. 
page 40 ~ I did not read the consumption figures, but they 
are-
Q. I also see that those pencil figures apparently show the 
amount of water consumed on the premises during each of 
the months in question f 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. How iR the C'lufrge made by the Commission computed? 
A. vVell, that iR computed on a rate chart, which is estab-
lished from onr official rates. In other words. if vou notice--
·1 have not got tlmt sheet, of course, in fr~11t of me-Step 
Rate 3. vV c have our rates translated into a formula whicl1 
enables us simply to multiply the amount of consumption 
·by the necessary formula figure and arrive at this particular 
result. Yon ,vill find that tlmt is based on our rate ~chedules, 
a minimum of $1.:30 for the first 1,300 cubic feet on a quar-
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terly basis, and so on. That goes straight through our rate 
steps. There is no question in your mind about the computa-
tion, is it f 
Q. That :figures out to approximately what percentage of 
the water bill 1 That is, the charges of the Commission figure 
out to--
A. Vv ell, it is not based in any way on the water rates. It 
is not a particularly-that percentage varies as the various 
rate classifications vary. In other words, for example, our 
rate scl1edule is a step rate plan. The City bas 
page 41 ~ a somewhat similar plan. Now, they may drop off 
very much more sharply than we do in certain rate 
brackets, and therefore, the percentage in those rate brackets 
might be higher. "\Ve have seen percentages thnt have run 
anywhere from about 35 per cent up to, in some rate brackets, 
as high as 50 per cent. · 
Q. As to all of these four apartments that we are concerned 
about here where the consumption is approximately the same 
since the apartment units are approximately the same size, 
your scale, your bracket, would be approximately the same 
as the City of Norfolk, would it noU 
A. Well, I don't understand exactly what you mean by 
that, Mr. Ferebee. Our-as far as our rates are concerned, 
they are entirely separate. They are based on entirely dif-
ferent amounts of consumption of water and it is-and, as 
a matter of fact, they have no particular relation in so far 
as rates are concerned at all. 
Q. You say, based on an entirely different consumption of 
waterf 
A. No. What I mean is, for imitance, the City of Norfolk 
has a minimum service charge of $2.50. This is an example. 
It will go throughout the rate steps; has a minimum charge 
of $2.50 per quarter. That allows the user 500 cubic feet of 
water. Over that, they begin to then pay on the basis of so 
much per 100 cubic feet. 
Now, on the other hand, we have a minimum rate 
page 42 } of $1.50 a quarter, but we allow for that $1.50 up 
to 1,300 cubic feet, and we don't begin chm·ging 
the next rate bracket at 10 cents until it does go over 1,300 
cubic feet. Then vou are charged on a basis of 10 cents per 
100 cubic feet. In" other words. what I am trying to point out 
is that we have an entirelv different base. vVe have an en-
tirelv different schedule of rates. I don't see that it bas any 
bearing on the matter. 
I 
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Q. But it runs, roughly, between 35 and 50 per cent of tI1e 
actual water charge Y 
A. It has done that; yes,. sir. It does not necessarily mean 
that that is so. It depends entirely on the rate bracket in: 
which they fall.. ' · 
Q. Mr. Morris, how long have you been with the Commis-
sion! 
· A. Two-approximately two years. 
Q. You were under Mr. Reid Digges when he was. general 
manager of the Commission t 
A. That .is correct, sir. 
Q. And you ·succeeded him as acting manag·er upon his 
resignation 1 
A. That is. correct. 
Q .. I believe· you were present at a conference held in Mr. 
Tazewell 's office,. between Mr. Taylor, Mr. Dig·ges, yourself 
and myself, were you not.J in connection with this matter! 
A. And also Mr. Kellam. Yes, sir. 
Q. At that tiµie, a decision was had,. was it not,. 
page 43 ~ as to the mann~r in which bills were being clmrg·ed 
to the owners of multiple-family buildings such as 
these four involved in tllis suit t 
Mr. Ashlmrn = Ir Your Honor please, we object to fliat or 
any discussion on the subject. The evid'enec makes p:lain how-
tbey are cliarged in this instance. Vv e c011tend tI1at is pro.per 
and legal and that is the only question. 
The Court: There is no objection to tlle question be inst 
asked. I imagine you object to the one Ile mrght follow ·with~ 
He was just asking wa:s- there a conferenef!. 
Mr. Ashburn: ,v ell, but I took it that he wantecl the wit-
ness to state wliat was said in tlle conferencc'-
Tbe, Court : He lias not asfrnd that yet. 
A. There was such a c©nf <1.n·~nce, yes~ 
By Mr. Ferebee·: . 
Q. That cemference- Trns fo clo with the apportionment of 
charges f6r use of water in multiple.family dwelli:ngsr diet if. 
not°! 
A. It was· a conference trrnt was in connection with the pos-
sibility of being able to do that. 
Q. Mr. Digges, as manager of the Connnission at that time 
and in your presence, did lie not~ made. a statemen..t ta. the-
effect that--
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page 44 ~ Mr. Asl1burn : Objected to. 
Mr. Ferebee: Just a minute. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. ( Continuing)-made a statement to the effect that the 
proper apportionment of these charges would require the 
billing of the water used by each of the tenants, and that the 
only reason that that method was not followed was because 
there was no individual water meter for each of the apart-
ments? 
Mr. Ashburn: Objected to, if Your Honor please.- Don't 
answer it ( addressing witness) until the Court rules. 
Mr. Ferebee: The reason for asking that question is this: 
The statute says that the method used by the Commission 
in assessing its charges must be uniform, as far as practicable 
in the community, to the ones who use the water. I think 
that any statement made by the Commission is binding on the 
Commission if it has any bearing· in the determination as to 
whether or not the method used is, as far as practicable, the 
best method of apportioning .those charges. 
Mr. Ashburn: Your Honor--
The Court: That would be ·an individual expression or 
construction of the meaning of the law. 
:Mr. Ferebee: No, sir, not that. 
The Court: That would be the result of it. For 
page 45 ~ that reason, it would not be admissible. The ob-
jection is sustained. 
iVIr. Ferebee: I note an exception, if Your Honor please. 
No further questions. 
RE-DIRECT FJX.AMINATTON. 
Bv Mr. Ashburn: 
• Q. As a matter of practice, l\Ir. :Morris, the Commission 
bases its charges on the amount of water consumed? 
A. That is c·orrect, sir. 
Q. And makes its charg·es to the person who bas contracted 
for that water 1 · 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Mr. Ashburn: "\Ve rest, Your Honor. 
,vALTER M. BOTT. 
recalled, testified further a.., follo,vs: 
Ex~mined by :Mr. Taylor: 
Q. Mr. Bott, when you were on the staud before, you were 
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requested to get a typical lease applying to each one of the 
four apartments. 
A. I was. 
page 46 ~ Q. And to bring them back and introduce them 
in evidence? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you done so? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you the other three here t 
A. I have the three. 
Q. I hand you four leases and ask you if those are. the 
lease~ ref erred to in your examination. 
The Court: You may answer it. You have just bad them. 
A. Y cs, sir. They are. 
By Mr. Taylor: 
Q. And those leases arc all uniform, arc they not, in their 
essentials? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·with the exception-
A. With the exception of the typewritten portion. 
Q. The typewritten portion, with the name of the lessee, 
description of the premises, dafo and amount of rental? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In all other particulars, tl1ey are uniform? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And those leases outline the entirP. relation-
page 47 ~ ship so far as your contract may apply as between 
you and your respective tenants 0? 
A. It does. 
Q. Mr. Taylor: '\Ve would like to offer these in evidence, 
appropriately marked. 
{The leases referred to were marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 
. 2, 3, 4 and 5 ; and the ledger sheets of the Hampton Road$ 
Sanitation District Commission, Monthly Uonsumption Rec-
ord, were marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7 and 8.) 
Mr. Taylor: ,v e. would like to reserve the privilege of 
withdrawing these l~ascs upon substitution of compared 
copies. 
(The case was then argued by counsel, after which th~ 
following occurred : ) 
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The Court: Gentlemen, I do not believe that this case 
would be here at :all •but for the fact that we have a rent 
control 1ict. The thirty-day lease which Mr. Bott has with 
the various tenants would expire and he would increase the 
rent to a sum to include the average sewerage charg-~; and 
this case would not be here at all. It is ]1ere. however. · 
The service performed by the Commiss'ion is purely a 
health measure and it inures to the benefit of everv 
page 48 } living soul in this community. The rich man can ;t 
occupy more space in the Lafayette River than the 
poor little colored boy who wants to avail himself of a swim 
in the river which this plan seeks to purify., 
The burden of the operation should be borne by everyo11e 
-equally according to the use he makes of it as an individual, 
and not placed on any special class of land owners or apart-
ment house owners or rich people. And that was the Gourt's 
view before the act was read just having read the newspaper 
account of this case, not having read the pleadings. 
But the Legislature seems to have, by its act, used suf-
ficient words to place liability on Mr. Bott or other apart-
ment house owners under like circumstances; and the Court 
will enter judgment for the amount set out i~ the answer. 
Mr. Taylor: We wish to save the point and ask the tJsrial 
suspension of execution. 
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